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DRAFT July 1, 2007 
 
Jerome Barron’s seminal writings that advocate a First Amend-
ment right of access to the media2 make a powerful case that constitu-
tional speech protection must actually yield dynamic, broad-based public 
debate in order to ensure the vitality of our democratic society.  Barron 
posited that the First Amendment’s underlying purpose is to enable effec-
tive democratic debate, and he accordingly called on courts to invoke the 
First Amendment to provide underfinanced and socially marginalized 
speakers access to the infrastructure of public discourse.  The mass me-
dia’s persistent incapacity to inform and guide public discussion of criti-
cal issues – most notably in recent years the decision to invade Iraq3 – 
reaffirms that argument’s urgency.  In the four decades since Barron’s 
seminal writings on access rights appeared, however, the Supreme Court 
and free speech theorists have largely ignored or scorned his prescription 
for a First Amendment right of access to the media, along with similar 
democracy-advancing arguments for strong First Amendment rights of 
access to the political process.  When the end toward which First 
Amendment access rights would aim is so obviously important, and when 
institutions that control access to public debate continue to suppress and 
exclude critically important dissenting perspectives, why has the case for 
access rights fallen so far out of favor? 
This article defends and elaborates Barron’s argument that courts 
can and should employ the First Amendment to advance equalization of 
access to means of expression.  Its primary goal is to explain and refute 
the two principal intellectual critiques of that argument, which I call the 
libertarian critique and the regulatory reform critique.  Part I sets the 
stage by assessing the state of Barron’s legacy.  The first section empha-
sizes the elements of Barron’s case for access rights that fuel the two cri-
tiques: an egalitarian, instrumental theory of expressive freedom, opposed 
by the libertarian critique; and the commitment to a judicially enforced 
  
 1 Professor of Law, Villanova University.  Thanks to Mike Carroll and Chaim Saiman 
for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
 2 See JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF ACCESS 
TO MASS MEDIA (1973); Jerome A. Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to 
the Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1968) (hereinafter Barron, Emerging Right); 
Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press – A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
1641 (1967) (hereinafter Barron, New Right). 
 3 For an indictment of the U.S. media’s failures to facilitate effective public debate 
before and during the early part of the Iraq War, see Gregory P. Magarian, The First 
Amendment, The Public-Private Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime 
Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 117-21 (2004) (hereinafter Magarian, Public-
Private Distinction). 
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constitutional requirement of broadly distributed expressive opportuni-
ties, opposed by the regulatory reform critique.   The second section ac-
counts for the importance of these critiques by noting First Amendment 
doctrine’s wholesale rejection of access rights.  It also notes technologi-
cal optimists’ disdain for distributive accounts of expressive freedom and 
explains why developments in information technology have not dimin-
ished Barron’s case for access rights. 
The article then proceeds to its primary task: assessing the two 
stores of intellectual capital that underwrite doctrinal rejection of access 
rights.  Part II critically analyzes the first of those positions, the libertar-
ian critique, which stands on a foundation of market triumphalism.  The 
first section presents the views of one group of libertarian thinkers, in-
cluding Charles Fried, Steven Gey, Jon McGinnis, and Christopher Yoo, 
whom I classify as conservative libertarians.  These critics openly es-
pouse a First Amendment theory that elevates the autonomy of speakers, 
including powerful institutions, above all other concerns.  They advocate 
a regime in which the economic market dictates people’s opportunities to 
participate in democratic discourse, and they assail any departure from 
their laissez-faire vision as statist tyranny.  The second section presents 
the views of a second group of libertarian critics, including Robert Post, 
Martin Redish, and Kathleen Sullivan, whom I classify as progressive 
libertarians.  These theorists sympathize with access rights advocates’ 
egalitarian concerns, and they offer thoughtful accounts of the First 
Amendment that acknowledge the importance of effective public debate 
for a healthy democratic system.  My analysis, however, reveals that pro-
gressive libertarians fully embrace the conservative libertarians’ core 
constitutional commitments: the autonomy-focused theory of expressive 
freedom, the insistence on market distribution of expressive opportuni-
ties, and the rhetorical strategy of demonizing access rights advocates as 
creeping tyrants.  Part II concludes by setting forth the primary empirical, 
theoretical, and normative reasons to reject the libertarians’ faith in unfet-
tered market control of democratic discourse. 
Part III critically analyzes the other principal attack on access 
rights, the regulatory reform critique.  The first section describes the ar-
guments of regulatory reformers, including C. Edwin Baker, Jack Balkin, 
and Mark Tushnet, against access rights.  Regulatory reformers agree 
with access rights advocates that public discourse needs to become more 
egalitarian and informative.  They also agree that government can and 
should play a role in improving public discourse.  They break with access 
rights advocates, however, by arguing that courts should not invoke the 
First Amendment to broaden media access.  Regulatory reformers trust 
the elected branches of government to implement access reforms, and 
they exemplify the prevailing academic pessimism about the utility of 
judicially enforced constitutional rights as a vehicle for progressive social 
change.  Accordingly, they urge courts to narrow the scope of the First 
Amendment so that legislators and regulators may impose progressive 
access rules.  The second section takes issue with the regulatory reform 
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critique.  I first contend that, just as the libertarians indulge an uncritical 
faith in the market, regulatory reformers indulge an uncritical faith in the 
elected branches of government.  Our present electoral system suffers 
from an unusual amalgam of electoral pathologies – some of which erode 
elected officials’ accountability to the public generally, others of which 
serve to perpetuate the exclusion of poor and socially marginalized peo-
ple from electoral politics – that doom any hope for legislative or regula-
tory efforts to broaden media access.  I then contend that constitutional 
rights provide a stronger theoretical basis, and courts a stronger institu-
tional vehicle, for broadening access to the means of expression.   
This article endeavors to show that Barron’s brief for access 
rights remains as persuasive today as it was 40 years ago.  The libertarian 
critique of access rights represents a reckless plunge into the market tri-
umphalism that has become a regrettably dominant feature of post-Cold 
War political rhetoric.  The regulatory reform critique places untenable 
reliance on elected officials in a system rife with electoral pathologies 
and undervalues judicial review in a field constitutional courts are well 
positioned to navigate.  Moving forward, advocates of access rights 
should pick up Barron’s flag and consider how best to achieve the aims 
he so eloquently articulated.  This article’s conclusion suggests First 
Amendment attacks on the very electoral pathologies that undermine the 
regulatory reform critique as a first step toward broadening media access 
and encouraging reformist impulses in the elected branches. 
 
I. THE LEGACY OF BARRON’S CASE FOR ACCESS RIGHTS 
 
Professor Barron’s writings form the cornerstone of a case for 
First Amendment rights of access to the means of public debate.  The first 
section of this part describes Barron’s case for access rights, emphasizing 
two key aspects of his argument: an underlying commitment to an egali-
tarian and instrumental theory of expressive freedom, and close attention 
to the institutional benefits and hazards that various public and private 
institutions present for the development of informative and inclusive pub-
lic debate.  These theoretical and institutional elements of the case for 
access rights provide the context for the article’s subsequent discussion of 
the intellectual currents that have led present First Amendment doctrine 
to reject access rights.  The second section notes the Court’s steadfast 
refusal to take access rights seriously in the years since Barron’s writings, 
and it briefly explains why access rights remain crucial even in an era of 
broadly accessible information technology. 
 
A. Barron’s Theoretical Foundations and Institutional Insights 
 
In advocating a First Amendment right of public access to the 
 10/31/2006 7:45:25 AM 
4 
media,4 Barron sought to constrain “the unanticipated power which the 
marriage of technology and capital has placed in the relatively few hands 
which dominate mass communication.”5  Employing economic and socio-
logical insights, he explained how the profit structures and communica-
tive dynamics of the mass media had created strong incentives for media 
corporations to avoid presenting opinions on controversial issues.6  In 
these circumstances, the conventional, “romantic view” of the First 
Amendment as a shield for speakers’ autonomy had “perpetuated the lack 
of legal interest in the availability to various interest groups of access to 
means of communication.”7  Accordingly, Barron called on courts to in-
terpret the First Amendment as ensuring a positive right of access for 
otherwise excluded speakers and ideas, to be applied with sensitivity to 
the distinctive contexts of different communications media.8  By “access” 
Barron meant not merely equal time for opposing opinions – a concept 
whose limitations he well recognized – but open space for a full range of 
subjects and viewpoints.9  Among the forms he saw access rights taking 
were a public right to have media outlets present discussion of public 
issues,10 a right for political speakers to purchase advertising space or 
time on equal terms with other members of the general public,11 and a 
right to have newspapers consider submissions for publication without 
ideological bias.12 
Barron’s call for access rights grew out of an egalitarian, instru-
mental theory of the First Amendment.  He emphasized “the positive di-
mension of the first amendment: The first amendment must be read to 
require opportunity for expression as well as protection for expression 
once secured.”13  In the tradition of Justice Brandeis14 and Alexander 
Meiklejohn, 15 Barron contended that the Constitution granted expressive 
  
 4 Barron’s emphasis on the word “media,” combined with his incisive analysis of the 
print and broadcast media, should not obscure the breadth of his conception of access rights, 
which extended to real property.  See Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 492-94 
(analyzing and praising Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 
(1968)). 
 5 Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 506. 
 6 See Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1644-47.  Barron’s view that the mass 
media’s lack of ideology drives their failure to engage the public in political debate provides 
an interesting contrast to contemporary arguments from both the left and right that media 
outlets deliberately advance their own policy preferences. 
 7 Id. at 1642. 
 8 See id. at 1653 (advocating contextual analysis).  
 9 See BARRON, supra note [x], at 150-59 (exploring differences between “access” and 
“fairness”). 
 10 See id. at 151. 
 11 See id. at 55-59 (proposing model statute). 
 12 See id. at 48. 
 13 Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 509. 
 14 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), dis-
cussed in Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1648-49. 
 15 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1948), discussed in Barron, New 
Right, supra note [x], at 1653. 
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freedom not out of a romantic commitment to autonomy in the abstract 
but rather because of our democratic system’s need for inclusive, thor-
ough debate about matters of public concern.16  He believed the equal 
participation values central to democratic ideals should inform the ex-
pressive freedom meant to implement those ideals.17  The First Amend-
ment guaranteed not just a private right of powerful institutions to speak 
but also “public rights in the communications process.”18  To the extent 
the media impeded rather than aided in broadening participation in public 
debate, the proper role of First Amendment doctrine was not to shield 
media owners’ autonomy but rather to obligate them to distribute expres-
sive opportunities more broadly.19  Barron viewed access rights as an 
alternative to left-wing calls for state suppression of right-wing ideas,20 
and he emphasized that his inclusive vision encompassed speakers on the 
right as well as the left.21  In particular, he found access rights inconsis-
tent with prohibitions on hate speech,22 instead advocating vigorous ef-
forts to open expressive opportunities for members of historically disad-
vantaged and marginalized communities.23 
Barron portrayed access rights as serving two values that appear 
inextricably linked in his conception of democracy: better informing the 
public and broadening participation in public debate.  First, he maintained 
that the validity of a First Amendment access claim should turn on 
“whether the material for which access is sought is indeed suppressed and 
underrepresented.”24  Exposure to the broadest possible range of informa-
tion optimizes the effectiveness of the political community in influencing 
and evaluating government decisions.25  Thus, Barron emphasized “[t]he 
failures of existing media . . . to convey unorthodox, unpopular, and new 
  
 16 See Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1673 (stressing necessity of “adequate 
opportunity for debate, for charge and countercharge”). 
 17 See id. at 1647 (criticizing romantic view of First Amendment for failing to recognize 
“inequality in the power to communicate ideas”). 
 18 Id. at 1665. 
 19 Barron chose, in my view, an unhelpful illustration of judicial solicitude for media 
power when he criticized New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), as a judicial 
license for powerful media to squelch debate by attacking reputations.  See Barron, New 
Right, supra note [x], at 1656-60; see also BARRON, supra note [x], at 7-12.  Barron’s analy-
sis of Sullivan paid insufficient attention to the Court’s careful assessment of the power 
dynamics between public officials and their critics, see Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-83, as well 
as the particular power disparity between the Jim Crow-enforcing plaintiff and the civil 
rights activists named as nonmedia defendants in the libel action.  Given these factors, 
Sullivan actually stands out as one of the Court’s most incisive defenses of public discourse 
against private abridgement. 
 20 See BARRON, supra note [x], at 75-81 (criticizing Herbert Marcuse’s arguments for 
“repressive tolerance”). 
 21 See id. at 85-89 (sympathetically considering Vice President Agnew’s charges that 
liberal elitists were excluding conservative voices from the mass media). 
 22 See id. at 288-303. 
 23 See id. at 300. 
 24 Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1677. 
 25 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003). 
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ideas [and] to afford full and effective hearing for all points of view.”26   
Second, Barron tied the force of access claims to “the degree to which the 
petitioner seeking access represents a significant sector of the commu-
nity.”27  This principle would give members of socially and economically 
marginalized groups opportunities to engage and influence public debate 
without regard to social standing or economic means.  By opening debate 
to marginalized speakers, access rights would advance “the relationship 
between a stable and vital political order and adequate access for protest 
to the significant means of communication”28  and satisfy “the longing for 
an information process which is truly participatory.”29 
Central to Barron’s case for access rights was an attack on First 
Amendment doctrine’s uncritical acceptance of a rigid public-private dis-
tinction.  “Only the new media of communication can lay sentiments be-
fore the public,” he explained, “and it is they rather than government who 
can most effectively abridge expression by nullifying the opportunity for 
an idea to win acceptance.”30  The defining characteristic of the romantic 
First Amendment doctrine he opposed was its “singular indifferen[ce] to 
the reality and implications of nongovernmental obstructions to the 
spread of political truth.”31  He cast powerful media institutions not as 
legal persons with paramount expressive autonomy rights but as “non-
governing minorities”32 who abuse their control over important commu-
nicative infrastructure to stifle public debate.  He charged any medium 
that could support democratic discourse with the responsibility of doing 
so.33  Accordingly, he contended that “[a]n access-oriented approach to 
the first amendment implies affirmative obligation on government as well 
as on the private sector and its concerns.”34  Even so, he opposed gov-
ernment surveillance of the press,35 and he conceived of the government’s 
role in mandating access to privately owned media as strictly procedural, 
disavowing any understanding of the First Amendment in which the gov-
  
 26 Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1647. 
 27 Id. at 1677. 
 28 Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 488; see also Barron, New Right, supra 
note [x], at 1650.  In this respect, Barron’s analysis ties First Amendment access rights to 
the familiar “social safety valve” argument for expressive freedom.  See Thomas I. Emerson, 
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 884-86 (explaining 
value of First Amendment for preserving balance between stability and change). 
 29 Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 509. 
 30 Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1656; see also id. at 1669 (suggesting that 
courts properly could treat newspapers, at least those with monopoly power, as having 
“quasi-public status” for purposes of constitutional analysis). 
 31 Id. at 1643. 
 32 Id. at 1649.  
 33 See Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 494 (claiming that “any natural or 
obvious forum in our society” bears “responsibilities for stimulating the communication of 
ideas.”); see also Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1675 (contending that “the nature of 
the communications process imposes quasi-public functions on these quasi-public instru-
mentalities”). 
 34 Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 494. 
 35 See BARRON, supra note [x], at 54. 
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ernment influenced the content of ideas.36  Access rights, in Barron’s con-
ception, would “build counterbalances into each sector.”37 
A final, crucial but little noted feature of Barron’s case for access 
rights is his primary faith in courts, rather than legislators or bureaucrats, 
to broaden access to the media.  Barron contended that the First Amend-
ment, given its instrumental purpose and egalitarian values, did not 
merely permit but rather required broad access to the means of communi-
cation.38  He recognized that an access rights regime would present diffi-
cult legal questions, such as which points of view were absent from pub-
lic discourse, where and how to require access for dissident speakers, and 
how much media attention to public controversies would adequately feed 
public debate.39  However, he anticipated and adroitly answered concerns 
about judicial competence to resolve access claims: the necessary analy-
sis, which would turn on “the public use and public need,” was “no more 
complex a judicial task than is presently involved in analyzing the puz-
zles of apportionment, school desegregation and obscenity.”40  While 
Barron endorsed legislative and regulatory reforms to expand access, par-
ticularly in the context of the electronic media,41 he believed “[i]t is by 
the judicial process that we shall establish the contours for answers to 
questions which a working right of access obviously presents.”42  Even in 
areas of legislative action, such as right-of-reply statutes, Barron main-
tained that “[a] right of access law is far more likely to serve as an effec-
tive counterpoise to media power if administered in the courts.”43  Bar-
ron’s advocacy of a judicially enforced constitutional right of media ac-
cess, while substantively radical, was also procedurally conservative.  
Acutely aware of the ignoble history of press licensing, he posited that – 
at least in cases of such traditionally nonregulated media as newspapers – 
courts would more fairly strike the proper balance between publishers’ 
  
 36 See Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 507. 
 37 Id. at 509. 
 38 See BARRON, supra note [x], at 22-25 (advocating judicial creation of a right of access 
to the press); see also Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1678 (positing that “it is open to 
the courts to fashion a remedy for a right of access, at least in the most arbitrary cases, 
independently of legislation”). 
 39 See Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 496 (summarizing legal questions 
that access rights claims would present). 
 40 Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 495; see also BARRON, supra note [x], at 
65 (identifying judicial independence and experience in enforcing First Amendment guaran-
tees as reasons to favor judicial administration of access rights). 
 41 See Barron, New Right, supra note [x], at 1674-76 (discussing sources of constitu-
tional authority for access rights legislation); see also Barron, Emerging Right, supra note 
[x], at 500 (“the existing structure of broadcast regulation permits an understanding of the 
problem of access which can be inclusive enough to reach failure to recognize or seek out 
dominant public issues”). 
 42 Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 496.  By the time of his 1973 book on 
access rights, Barron realized that courts were refusing to implement access rights.  See 
BARRON, supra note [x], at 25. 
 43 BARRON, supra note [x], at 64. 
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editorial interests and the public’s access interests.44 
In the two decades following publication of Barron’s work on ac-
cess rights, his arguments received forceful scholarly defense and elabo-
ration, notably from Owen Fiss45 and Cass Sunstein.46  Like the Vietnam 
era that fostered Barron’s ideas, and the McCarthy era during which 
Meiklejohn developed his First Amendment theory, the present War on 
Terrorism would appear to cast the importance of access rights into par-
ticularly sharp relief.47  Unfortunately, First Amendment doctrine and 
more recent scholarly commentary have almost uniformly rejected Bar-
ron’s First Amendment vision. 
 
B. Access Rights, First Amendment Doctrine, and the Fallacy of 
Technological Optimism 
 
The Supreme Court’s rejection of access rights is a familiar chap-
ter in recent First Amendment history.  Because I have told that story at 
length elsewhere,48 I will not dwell on its details here.  The Court in a 
wide range of First Amendment disputes has foresworn any emphasis on 
equalizing expressive access and enriching public debate, instead equat-
ing speech with property and thus insulating the economic market’s pre-
political distribution of expressive opportunities.  Under present First 
Amendment doctrine, mass media owners may refuse to sell advertising 
  
 44 See Barron, Emerging Right, supra note [x], at 495; see also Barron, New Right, 
supra note [x], at 1667.  Barron, perhaps mistakenly, valued the print media’s contributions 
to public discourse above those of the electronic media.  See Barron, Emerging Right, supra, 
at 495.  Even so, he avoided the trap of premising his case for access rights on technological 
factors, emphasizing that economic consolidation in the print media posed as great an im-
pediment to the diversity of public discourse as technological limitations of the electronic 
media.  Compare Barron, New Right, supra, at 1666 with Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 
U.S. 367, 387-89 (1969) (emphasizing broadcast spectrum scarcity in upholding FCC’s fair-
ness doctrine).  His argument for access rights turned not on scarcity but on the societal 
benefits of informative, inclusive debate and the social reality of inequalities in the distribu-
tion of expressive opportunities.  See Barron, New Right, supra, at 1645 (emphasizing need 
to focus on content rather than technology). 
 45 See OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES 
OF STATE POWER (1996) (hereinafter FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED); OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY 
OF FREE SPEECH (1996); Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship, 100 YALE L.J. 
2087 (1991) (hereinafter Fiss, State Activism); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 781 (1987) (hereinafter Fiss, Why the State?); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social 
Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986) (hereinafter Fiss, Social Structure). 
 46 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993) 
(hereinafter SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 
255 (1992). 
 47 See Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Due Process as a Source of Constitutional 
Protection for Nonpolitical Speech, 90 MINN. L. REV. 247, 254-57 (2005) (discussing parallels 
between period that gave rise to Meiklejon’s First Amendment theory and post-2001 period) 
(hereinafter Magarian, Substantive Due Process). 
 48 For a detailed account of the Court’s expressive access decisions, see Gregory P. 
Magarian, The Jurisprudence of Colliding First Amendment Interests: From the Dead End 
of Neutrality to the Open Road of Participation Reinforcing Review, at ___-___ (forthcoming 
2007) (hereinafter Magarian, Colliding Interests). 
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space to political speakers;49 owners of shopping malls may ban speakers 
who seek the access to public audiences that the public square once pro-
vided;50 wealthy concerns face few constraints in crowding more mod-
estly funded voices out of electoral discourse;51 and copyright holders 
face only minimal statutory constraints in barring incorporation of their 
intellectual property into new creations.52  All of these rejections of ac-
cess rights reflect the Court’s disregard for the interests of socially mar-
ginalized, disaggregated, and underfinanced would-be speakers – the 
bearers of access rights claims – and solicitude for the interests of power-
ful institutional speakers – the targets of access rights claims.53  Those 
priorities, in turn, reflect the Court’s rejection of a free speech theory 
focused on advancing the public’s interest in informative, inclusive de-
mocratic discourse in favor of a theory focused on protecting empowered 
speakers’ autonomy against government interference.54 
The Court has employed two primary doctrinal strategies to dis-
pense with access rights claims.55  In contexts such as the political adver-
tising and shopping mall cases,56 which squarely present the question 
whether the First Amendment guarantees some measure of access to 
means of expression, the Justices deny the existence of access rights as 
anathema to the First Amendment.  In other cases, where advocates suc-
ceed in portraying access reforms as matters of legislative or regulatory 
  
 49 Compare CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (rejecting 
political advertisers’ First Amendment claim of right to purchase advertising) with Red 
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding statutorily authorized right of reply 
requirement and emphasizing public’s interest in balanced information).  For further dis-
cussion, see Magarian, Colliding Interests, supra note [x], at ___. 
 50 Compare Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (rejecting First Amendment right 
of access to shopping center) with Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 
U.S. 308 (1968) (announcing First Amendment right of access to shopping center).  For 
further discussion, see Magarian, Colliding Interests, supra note [x], at ___. 
 51 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).  For further discussion, see 
Magarian, Colliding Interests, supra note [x], at ___. 
 52 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).  For further discussion, see Magarian, 
Colliding Interests, supra note [x], at ___. 
 53 See Gregory P. Magarian, The Pragmatic Populism of Justice Stevens’s Free Speech 
Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2201, 2204-06 (2006).  The Court still shows occasional 
concern for the interests of marginalized and underfinanced speakers, although Justice 
Stevens appears to stand alone in making that concern a priority.  See id. at 2212-27. 
 54 See Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public Rights” First 
Amendment, 44 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 1939, 1951-52 (2003) (discussing Court’s shift to-
ward autonomy-based First Amendment theory) (hereinafter Magarian, Political Parties). 
 55 In a broad sense, we might view free speech doctrine generally as a regime of access 
rights, because the First Amendment requires people adversely affected by speech to bear 
its costs.  See generally Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 
1321 (1992).  This redistributive element of free speech law appears most clearly in the 
public forum doctrine, to the extent the Court requires the public to dedicate its property to 
the expressive uses of people without access to private expressive property.  Theorists on all 
sides of the access rights debate, however, appear to agree that judicially mandated access 
to privately held expressive property would entail a distinctive change in present First 
Amendment doctrine. 
 56 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
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discretion in areas of constitutional uncertainty, the Court submerges the 
constitutional dimension of the problem and defers to the elected 
branches.57  These twin strategies of denial and deference58 roughly cor-
respond with, and reflect the influence of, the two principal theoretical 
critiques of access rights – the libertarian critique, which objects to access 
rights on constitutional principle, and the regulatory reform critique, 
which embraces access reforms but opposes judicial recourse to the First 
Amendment as a basis for expanding access.  The bulk of this article will 
address those two critiques. 
One circumstance that might obviate the need for any theoretical 
critique of access rights is the ongoing revolution in information technol-
ogy.  The explosion of online communication over the past fifteen years 
has triggered a wave of technological optimism, which has led many 
theorists to proclaim that cyberspace will ameliorate the communicative 
inequalities that inspired Barron to advocate access rights.59  If the tech-
nological optimists are right, the open-ended character of online commu-
nication – the easy ability of anyone with a computer and an Internet 
connection to join public debate – will by itself ensure the representation 
in public debate of every variety of speaker and perspective present in the 
body politic.  Although the technological optimist argument does not in-
dict Barron’s case for access rights as constitutionally out of bounds or 
institutionally ill-advised,60 it does suggest a basis for shrugging off his 
ideas as irrelevant.  The Court occasionally has prefigured this argument 
by invoking technological distinctions among media to reject access 
claims.61 
  
 57 See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (upholding against 
First Amendment challenge California constitutional provision for right of access to shop-
ping centers); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (upholding against First Amendment 
challenge federal regulatory requirement that broadcasters sell advertising time to political 
candidates). 
 58 See Magarian, Colliding Interests, supra note [x], at ___ (examining Court’s use of 
denial and deference techniques in expressive access cases). 
 59 See, e.g., John P. Barlow, A Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace (1996), 
http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2006); 
Allen S. Hammond, Regulating Broadband Communication Networks, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 
181, 190-92 (1992). 
 60 Various proponents of the libertarian and regulatory reform critiques of access 
rights incorporate technological optimism into their arguments.  See MARTIN H. REDISH, 
MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 190-92 (2001); 
Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression 
for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004) (hereinafter Balkin, Digital Speech); 
Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 225, 252 (1992); John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the 
First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 100-31 (1996);  Kathleen M. Sullivan, First 
Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of Cyberspace, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1653 (1998) (here-
inafter Sullivan, Intermediaries); Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technol-
ogy-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245 (2003) (hereinafter Yoo, 
Rise and Demise). 
 61 Compare, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387-89 (1969) (citing scar-
city of broadcast spectrum as ground for upholding broadcast access regulation) with 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-40 (1994) (rejecting Red Lion scarcity 
 
 10/31/2006 7:45:25 AM 
  11 
A thorough critique of the technological optimist position lies be-
yond the scope of this article.  I simply offer a few observations about 
why Barron’s case for access rights transcends recent and foreseeable 
developments in information technology.  Barron’s argument, as de-
scribed above,62 implicates three distinct problems with the mass media: 
that the cost of entry to media discourse excludes many speakers from 
participating, and thus prevents many ideas from circulating; that, accord-
ingly, private concentrations of wealth and power control media access to 
a socially detrimental extent; and that the mass media generally fail to 
contribute to public debate socially valuable discussions of important 
issues from a wide range of perspectives.  I will call these the cost, con-
centration, and contribution premises of the case for access rights.  Even 
in our age of burgeoning information technology, one or more of these 
three premises will remain relevant for the foreseeable future, ensuring 
the continued vitality of Barron’s case for access rights. 
The media premise of the case for access rights that the Internet 
most obviously undermines is cost.  Anyone with access to a computer – 
and fewer people every day fall outside that category63 – knows that the 
Internet has created unprecedented, undeniable, and welcome opportuni-
ties for ordinary people of modest means to communicate with mass au-
diences.  Even that cornerstone of technological optimists’ disregard for 
access rights, however, has two plainly visible cracks.  First, traditional 
mass media, such as the major broadcast networks, commercial radio sta-
tions, and urban daily newspapers, still exert tremendous influence over 
public debate.64  Continuing developments in online communication will, 
albeit to an unpredictable extent, further marginalize the traditional me-
dia.  Historical experience, however, suggests the new medium will never 
completely eradicate the old ones.  All of television’s technological inno-
vation has never fully supplanted newspapers, magazines, and the radio.  
That phenomenon probably owes something to the paradoxical advan-
tages that limitations can confer.  Faced with the opportunity to absorb 
information passively from a screen, some people, some of the time, still 
prefer active perusal of the printed page.  In the same way, the Internet’s 
customizable interactivity appears to make some people, some of the 
time, appreciate television’s prepackaged mass appeal.  Second, even the 
Internet has already evolved to reward aspects of communication – such 
as sophisticated graphics, highly interactive features, and the ability to 
receive prime position from search engines – that require substantial re-
  
rationale as basis for justifying cable television access requirement). 
 62 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
 63 See Seth F. Kreimer, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the 
First Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 119, 140-42 (2001) (de-
scribing narrowing of the “digital divide”). 
 64 See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note [x], at 10 (noting that “traditional mass me-
dia . . . still play a crucial role in setting agendas because they still provide the lion’s share 
of news and information to most people”). 
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sources.65  This phenomenon reflects competition for scarce audience 
attention in a world of virtually limitless information.66 
The possibility that high costs of entry to significant public de-
bates may persist even in cyberspace also implicates the second media 
premise of the case for access rights – concentration.  Although the Inter-
net presents great possibilities for making communication more egalitar-
ian, substantial structural inequalities persist in cyberspace.  The complex 
architecture of online communication is not some state of nature; rather, 
it is a construct whose functions and attributes will always depend on the 
regulatory constraints that both governments and nongovernmental au-
thorities impose on it.67  The Internet, like traditional mass media, gives 
powerful access providers both ample opportunities and strong incentives 
to consolidate their power by creating communication bottlenecks.68   The 
same economic factors that have produced concentration and undermined 
diversity in the traditional mass media have carried over in substantial 
measure to cyberspace.69  The Internet’s seemingly egalitarian diversity 
of content actually facilitates consolidation, by generating a process of 
preference-reinforcement that inclines audiences to focus on a relatively 
small percentage of available content.70  Whether the future Internet will 
look more concentrated or more disaggregated remains a very open ques-
tion. 
Finally, even in the technological optimists’ best of all possible 
worlds – in which the Internet fully supplants traditional mass media and 
everyone has an equal share in controlling it – the contribution premise 
  
 65 See C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 
839, 897-99 (2002) (discussing economic factors that could facilitate corporate dominance of 
online media) (hereinafter Baker, Media Concentration); Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy 
Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets, 
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1453 (2004) (noting that “the benefits of scale and incum-
bency will continue to exist in the digital world”). 
 66 See Kreimer, supra note [x], at 142-43 (describing relationship between “digital 
attention deficit” and increased expense of online communication). 
 67 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); see 
also Baker, Media Concentration, supra note [x], at 896 (emphasizing that Internet merely 
distributes content and carries no guarantee about diversity or nature of content it distrib-
utes); Eben Moglen, The Invisible Barbecue, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 945 (1997) (criticizing Tele-
communications Act of 1996 for favoring concentrated private interests rather than general 
public in regulation of information technology); Margaret J. Radin, Property Evolving in 
Cyberspace, 15 J. L. & COM. 509, 523-26 (1996) (describing Internet’s amenability to regula-
tory control and expressing doubt about unfettered market’s ability to produce an open, 
competitive Internet). 
 68 See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 295-96 (2002) (discussing 
possibilities for online bottlenecks). 
 69 See id. at 285-307 (thoroughly analyzing economic features of online communication 
and concluding that Internet has not ameliorated problems with market distributions of 
media access); Goodman, supra note [x], at 1453-54 (noting traditional media powerhouses’ 
success in transferring their dominance to Internet). 
 70 See Clay Shirky, Power Laws, Weblogs, and Inequality (Feb. 8, 2003), 
http://www.shirky.com/writings/powerlaw_weblog.html (last visited Oct. 26, 
2006). 
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for access rights arguably retains its salience.  The contribution premise is 
more obviously normative than the other two, because it values commu-
nication about particular subject matter – issues of substantial public con-
cern – as well as diversity of perspectives and participants in debate.  No 
one can confidently predict whether even a highly disaggregated system 
of online communication will exceed traditional mass media in fostering 
discussion of public issues and bringing marginalized voices into public 
discourse.  The culprit, once again, is scarcity of audience attention.  Al-
though online content providers can produce endless quantities of infor-
mation, audiences may expend their time available for Internet consump-
tion before alighting on any matter of public concern.71  Those unmoved 
by the normative priorities underlying the case for access rights tend to 
brand any critique of audiences’ market choices paternalistic.72  However, 
even assuming paternalism in this context is out of bounds,73 the online 
audience’s apparent “choice” to disdain political debate might actually 
result inexorably from content providers’ disincentive to produce infor-
mation with broad, collective benefits rather than precision-guided ap-
peal. 
The Internet’s distinctive architecture makes implementation of 
any online access rights regime a complicated proposition, requiring nu-
anced technological as well as legal insights.74  The Internet does not, 
however, obviate the problems of cost, concentration, and contribution 
that plague existing mass media and animate Barron’s case for access 
  
 71 For discussions of the relationship between attention scarcity and underproduction 
of information about matters of public concern, see BAKER, supra note [x], at 289 (noting 
that technology’s dispersion of audience attention complicates production of “many cultur-
ally or politically valuable media contents”); Goodman, supra note [x], at 1455-61 (identify-
ing attention deficit and diminished quality of attention as factors of digital communication 
technology that discourage production of information valuable for democratic deliberation); 
Moglen, supra note [x], at 952-53 (indicting commodification of human attention as generat-
ing “media designed to force images and information at us, rather than to respond to our 
requests”); Radin, supra note [x], at 517 (“In a world where attention is property, noncom-
modified political and social ideas and interactions may wither”). 
 72 See infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing libertarian view that 
market distributions of expressive opportunities accurately reflect individual preferences).  
For discussion of that argument’s empirical and normative failings, see infra notes ___-___, 
___-___ and accompanying text. 
 73 Cass Sunstein contends that such “paternalistic” policy initiatives actually can 
amount to “the people, acting in their capacity as citizens, . . . attempting to implement 
aspirations that diverge from their consumption choices.”  SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra 
note [x], at 74. 
 74 Ellen Goodman offers a technologically and architecturally sophisticated proposal 
focused on the value of targeted government subsidies in an environment of plentiful infor-
mation and scarce audience attention.  See Goodman, supra note [x], at 1461-67.   For an 
alternative proposal with more aggressive regulatory components, see CASS SUNSTEIN, 
REPUBLIC.COM 167-90 (2001).  Goodman’s proposal, in my view, makes a great deal of sense 
on its own terms, although her analysis overstates the force of First Amendment impedi-
ments to more proactive regulation.  See Goodman, supra, at 1462-64.  Conversely, some of 
Sunstein’s prescriptions, such as requiring any opinionated Web site to provide links to 
opposing points of view, see SUNSTEIN, supra, at 186-87, overreach even a public rights 
conception of the First Amendment while also taking insufficient account of technological 
and architectural challenges. 
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rights.  Until and unless online communication eliminates all of those 
problems, Barron’s arguments will continue to light a path toward the 
goals of a better informed public and a more fully participatory democ-
ratic system.  I now turn to the deeper questions that generate the two 
principal critiques of access rights: whether a proper understanding of the 
First Amendment precludes any government effort to broaden access to 
the means of expression, and – if not – whether a proper understanding of 
institutional arrangements within government marks the political 
branches, and not the judiciary, as the proper source of those reforms. 
 
II. THE LIBERTARIAN CRITIQUE OF ACCESS RIGHTS 
 
The decline of academic arguments for First Amendment access 
rights roughly corresponds with the collapse of the Soviet empire.  The 
fall of the Berlin Wall has inspired a surge in free-market triumphalism, 
unmatched since the Industrial Revolution, which infers from the collapse 
of Soviet-style totalitarian bureaucratism a complete vindication of lais-
sez-faire capitalism.75  This market triumphalism helps to contextualize, 
and ultimately indict, the first of two principal intellectual critiques of 
access rights:76 the libertarian critique.  The first section of this part pre-
sents the conservative libertarian version of that critique, defined by an 
autonomy-centered theory of the First Amendment, an unwavering faith 
in economic market distributions of expressive opportunities, and a con-
viction that any deviation from a laissez-faire First Amendment amounts 
to censorship bordering on tyranny.  The second section discusses a 
seemingly more moderate articulation of the libertarian critique, the pro-
gressive libertarian version.  Although progressive libertarian theorists 
express sympathy with the egalitarian and democratic concerns that ani-
mate calls for access rights and offer more nuanced analyses of free 
speech issues, my discussion reveals that they echo all three of the con-
servative libertarians’ major chords.  The final section contends that the 
rigid constitutional commitment to markets that defines both versions of 
the libertarian critique suffers from fatal empirical, theoretical, and nor-
mative problems. 
 
A. The Conservative Libertarian Version 
 
The libertarian critique emerges most predictably and straight-
forwardly from a group I will call conservative libertarians, which in-
  
 75 See generally THOMAS FRANK, ONE MARKET UNDER GOD: EXTREME CAPITALISM, 
MARKET POPULISM, AND THE END OF ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (2001). 
 76 Not all of the critics discussed in this article respond directly to Barron’s case for 
media access rights.  Most of them criticize access rights alongside other regulatory propos-
als, including bans on hate speech and pornography, and some address ideas, such as cam-
paign finance regulation, that fall within a broader conception of access rights.  My discus-
sion addresses arguments that either respond to access rights proposals or contribute to the 
critic’s objections to access rights. 
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cludes Charles Fried,77 Steven Gey,78 John McGinnis,79 and Christopher 
Yoo.80  These theorists’ arguments against access rights, although varied 
in approach and emphasis, make three common claims.  First, they all 
embrace an autonomy-focused theory of expressive freedom.  The con-
servative libertarians proceed from a theoretical premise, axiomatic in 
classical liberalism, that the First Amendment provides nothing more than 
negative protection for speakers’ autonomy against government regula-
tion.81  This autonomy-based approach to First Amendment theory serves 
the normative political theory of interest group pluralism, which holds 
that democratic societies properly distribute social goods through a proc-
ess of conflict among groups of self-interested utility maximizers.82  Con-
servative libertarians seek First Amendment protection for speakers’ 
autonomy so that communication can facilitate those conflicts in the po-
litical sphere and, more importantly, market exchanges in the private 
sphere.83  Fried exemplifies this approach when he describes communica-
tion as “a transaction between citizens” that free speech law protects from 
collective interference.84 
  
 77 See Fried, supra note [x].  Fried attacks access rights alongside distinct proposals by 
critical race and feminist theorists to alter First Amendment doctrine.  My discussion is 
limited to his arguments against access rights. 
 78 See Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PENN. 
L. REV. 193 (1996).  Gey as well attacks critical race and feminist proposals in addition to 
access rights.  My discussion addresses only his treatment of access rights, which primarily 
targets Cass Sunstein.  See SUNSTEIN DEMOCRACY, supra note [x]. 
 79 See McGinnis, supra note [x]. 
 80 See Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 
669 (2005) (hereinafter Yoo, Architectural Censorship); Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note 
[x]. 
 81 See Fried, supra note [x], at 233 (“Freedom of expression is properly based on 
autonomy . . . .”); Gey, supra note [x], at 232 (unfavorably comparing egalitarian free speech 
regime to one that “attempts to allocate to nongovernmental actors the right to choose their 
particular worldview and make their own basic decisions about social values”); McGinnis, 
supra note [x], at 57 (positing expressive freedom as “rooted in the natural rights of the 
individual”) (footnote omitted); Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note [x], at 316 (positing that 
analysis of democracy-based approaches to free speech “turns largely on their ability to 
come to grips with . . . autonomy-based visions of free speech”). 
 82 See Magarian, Political Parties, supra note [x], at 1953 (describing correspondence 
between autonomy-based First Amendment theories and interest group pluralism). 
 83 See Gey, supra note [x], at 262-64 n.212, 271 (arguing for superiority of interest 
group pluralism over civic republican political theory); McGinnis, supra note [x], at 53-55 
(asserting that proper understanding of expressive freedom turns on insights of public 
choice theory and economic theories of communication); Yoo, Architectural Censorship, 
supra note [x], at ___ (basing constitutional analysis of media policy on economic analysis of 
media markets). 
 84 Fried, supra note [x], at 236.  McGinnis likewise seeks “to cleanse the First 
Amendment of the obscuring varnish of social democracy and reveal its true origins as a 
property right of the individual, thus providing a model for an emerging laissez-faire juris-
prudence.”  McGinnis, supra note [x], at 56.  He derives this economically driven approach 
to expressive freedom from a biological premise that “the human faculty of speech evolved 
to improve economic well-being.”  Id. at 55.  He further asserts, based on the premise that 
“civic understanding in a democracy is inevitably limited,” that democratic principles are 
inappropriate not only in First Amendment adjudication but also “in other areas of social 
life.”  Id. at 126 n.320. 
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Second, conservative libertarians oppose access rights because, 
for them, the market’s allocation of expressive opportunities defines dis-
tributive justice, and thus any “information-producing property”85 is pro-
tected speech.  McGinnis explicitly identifies speech as a property right.86  
Fried celebrates private rights as “indifferent – blessedly – to the ideo-
logical uses to which their beneficiaries would put them,”87 and Gey simi-
larly portrays the absence of government regulation as “neutrality – 
which entails the protection of individual privacy and intellectual auton-
omy.”88  Yoo likewise dismisses concerns about distributive justice as 
irrelevant to First Amendment analysis.89  These theorists presume 
choices unconstrained by direct government regulation to be freely made 
and thus immune to structural criticism.90  Thus, the existing market dis-
tribution of expressive opportunities, by definition, accurately reflects the 
will of the people.91  Because conservative libertarians ascribe absolute 
legitimacy to market distributions, the mere possibility that an access 
rights regime might have disadvantages or might fail to achieve its aims 
suffices to condemn it.92  Conversely, conservative libertarians dismiss 
concerns about nongovernmental suppression of expression by invoking a 
rigid public-private distinction, which denies corporations and other pri-
  
 85 McGinnis, supra note [x], at 93. 
 86 See id. at 58-99 (arguing that Framers’ intent and economic theory require a prop-
erty-based view of the First Amendment).  On this basis, McGinnis finds a parallel between 
the Court’s application of deferential First Amendment scrutiny to cable “must carry” re-
quirements, see Turner Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), and the French 
Revolution.  See McGinnis, supra, at 117-18; see also Fried, supra note [x], at 230 (compar-
ing access rights advocates to “Jacobins”). 
 87 Fried, supra note [x], at 235 n.47 (discussing “background systems” of tort, property, 
and criminal law). 
 88 Gey, supra note [x], at 261. 
 89 See Yoo, Architectural Censorship, supra note [x], at 687 n.65; see also id. at 689-90, 
715 n.209 (suggesting that regulatory attempts to ensure diverse viewpoints in public de-
bate violate the First Amendment). 
 90 See Gey, supra note [x], at 212 (attacking idea that “individual preferences . . . 
evolve as they adapt to new social conditions”); McGinnis, supra note [x], at 100 (character-
izing Internet as “an example of spontaneous order” because it results from decisions “with-
out the central direction of the state”); Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note [x], at 318-19 (pro-
claiming any questioning of process by which market influences preference formation “fun-
damentally inconsistent with most democratic forms of government”).  Fried acknowledges 
the existence of nongovernmental constraints on autonomy but presumes that “[o]ther legal 
norms” outside the Constitution eliminate those constraints.  Fried, supra note [x], at 234-
35. 
 91 See Fried, supra note [x], at 251-52 & n.205 (arguing that any underrepresentation 
in public debate of “opinions on the left” must mean those ideas are “boring” and “uncon-
vincing”); Gey, supra note [x], at 265 (claiming that access rights arguments merely reflect 
the fact that “most of the public has used its existing freedom to reject or ignore . . . favored 
programming in favor of other, less enlightening alternatives”); Yoo, Architectural Censor-
ship, supra note [x], at 675-713 (using economic analysis to deny existence of “market fail-
ures” in broadcasting). 
 92 See Gey, supra note [x], at 224 (arguing against access rights based on the possibil-
ity that they might “do more harm than good”); McGinnis, supra note [x], at 123 (discussing 
practical advantages of market over “centralized authority”); Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra 
note [x], at 324-41 (discussing potential problems with implementing access rights). 
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vate entities any legally cognizable capacity to undermine expressive 
freedom.93  Any attempt to ameliorate privately driven constraints on ex-
pression runs aground on the twinned convictions that government can 
only harm expressive freedom and that only government can harm ex-
pressive freedom.   
Finally, conservative libertarians’ equation of the economic mar-
ket with freedom leads them to equate any effort to create a more egali-
tarian distribution of expressive opportunities with tyrannical state inter-
ference in the proper working of the market.  Gey and Yoo, beginning 
with their article titles, repeatedly indict access rights as “censorship.”94  
Gey situates access rights advocates among a class of “postmodern cen-
sors” who “would reinstitute a degree of government control over speech 
and thought . . . so that the government could mold political reality to its 
own liking.”95   Fried dredges up an especially pungent comparison, lik-
ening access rights advocates to “socialists”96 and “apologists for Marx-
ism-Leninism.”97  Conservative libertarians dismiss as a fabrication the 
portrayal of access rights as a substantively neutral effort to encourage 
presentation of a wide range of viewpoints.98  Rather, they see access 
rights as a means to force a specifically left-wing political agenda upon 
an unsuspecting people.99  Fried, warming to his Cold War theme, por-
  
 93 See Fried, supra note [x], at 234 (stating that “[p]rivate impositions and limitations 
differ fundamentally from state impositions” because “they issue from the limiting person’s 
own exercise of liberty”); Gey, supra note [x], at 242 (variously asserting that “the pub-
lic/private distinction” and “some separation between the governors and the governed” is 
necessary to democracy); Yoo, Architectural Censorship, supra note [x], at 715 n.207 (dis-
missing concerns about private suppression of expression with conclusory statement that 
“the state action doctrine . . . represents one of the central underpinnings of classic liberal 
theory”). 
 94 See Gey, supra note [x]; Yoo, Architectural Censorship, supra note [x].  Indeed, Yoo’s 
conception of “censorship” extends beyond access rights to any government action, such as 
the choice to promote advertiser-supported broadcasting and restrictions on ownership of 
media enterprises, that has the result of altering market distributions of expressive oppor-
tunities.  See Yoo, supra, at 685 (discussing advertiser-supported broadcasting model), 701 
(discussing horizontal ownership restrictions), 713 (discussing vertical ownership restric-
tions).  McGinnis similarly sees any regulation specifically directed at information-
producing property as a presumptive First Amendment violation.  See McGinnis, supra note 
[x], at 116 & n.285 (criticizing media ownership restrictions). 
 95 Gey, supra note [x], at 198; see also id. at 260 (ascribing to access rights advocates 
the “Orwellian” notion that “restriction equals freedom”); id. at 269 (“Speech regulations are 
proposed as a means of permanently altering the thought patterns of the citizens living 
under the control of the government”). 
 96 Fried, supra note [x], at 251. 
 97 Id. at 252. 
 98 See id. at 251 (claiming that access rights arguments based on “self-government and 
support for the fullest measure of public controversy” are “not arguments we can take seri-
ously”). 
 99 See Gey, supra note [x], at 231-32 (claiming that access rights would create an “elit-
ist” regime); McGinnis, supra note [x], at 123 n.304 (asserting that “many academics on the 
left favor regulation despite th[e] growth of information sources because of their growing 
realization that most of the truths emerging from contemporary social inquiry are not hos-
pitable to collectivist and egalitarian ideals”); Yoo, Architectural Censorship, supra note [x], 
at 674 n.13 (suggesting that structural media regulations mask intent to control media 
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trays the case for access rights as “an argument for censorship . . . to 
avoid the competition, in much the spirit that East European television 
used to jam Western broadcasts of ‘Dallas.’”100 
 
B. The Progressive Libertarian Version 
 
More compelling, for anyone not normatively committed to un-
regulated market control of expression, is the critique offered by what I 
will call progressive libertarian opponents of access rights, notably 
Robert Post, Martin Redish, and Kathleen Sullivan.  These theorists, 
unlike the conservative libertarians, share the normative concerns of Bar-
ron and other access rights advocates about inequality in the distribution 
of expressive opportunities and /or deficits in the quality of public debate.  
Sullivan acknowledges the relevance of distributive concerns to First 
Amendment doctrine.101  Post abhors “the inequalities that afflict our con-
temporary media [and] the many ways in which the quality of our public 
discourse is undercut by the skew of market forces,”102 and he credits 
access rights advocates with “a sincere and admirable effort to rejuvenate 
democratic self-governance.”103  Redish, although generally suspicious of 
redistributive impulses,104 seems to acknowledge the desirability of “en-
riching public debate by including the expression of those who normally 
lack communicative access to the public at large.”105  All of these theo-
rists care about the relationship between free speech and democracy.  
Despite their normative sympathies, however, the progressive libertarians 
reject as a constitutional matter any public initiative to broaden access to 
the means of expression, viewing arguments for access rights as mis-
guided egalitarian attacks on the laudable status quo that Sullivan calls 
“progressive free speech libertarianism.”106  
  
content). 
 100 Fried, supra note [x], at 252. 
 101 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution, and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 439, 450 (1995) (hereinafter Sullivan, Discrimination). 
 102 Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. 
L. REV. 1517, 1538 (1997) (reviewing FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note [x]) (hereinafter 
Post, Equality and Autonomy). 
 103 Post, Mieklejohn’s Mistake, supra note [x], at 1124. 
 104 See REDISH, supra note [x], at 153-61 (critiquing theoretical bases for redistribu-
tion). 
 105 Id. at 191. 
 106 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, 48 S.M.U. L. REV. 203, 213 (1994) (herein-
after Sullivan, Free Speech Wars); see also REDISH, supra note [x], at 152 (praising tradi-
tional understanding of First Amendment); Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at 
1539-40 (favorably contrasting “the free speech tradition” with arguments for access rights); 
Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, supra note [x], at 206-09 (favorably describing the “modern free 
speech consensus”).  Post has at times strongly criticized conventional First Amendment 
doctrine, albeit in terms that do not undermine his libertarian perspective on access rights.  
See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1995); 
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, De-
mocratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 678-79 
(1990) (describing doctrinal failures related to concept of public discourse) (hereinafter Post, 
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The progressive libertarians’ objections to access rights spring 
from far more nuanced accounts of expressive freedom than the conserva-
tives’ unvarnished market triumphalism.  Sullivan argues that differences 
between economic goods and speech justify perpetuating the constitu-
tional asymmetry between the permissibility of economic regulations and 
the impermissibility of speech regulations.107  Redish critiques access 
rights within the broad framework of redistributive theory,108 and he 
draws a damning comparison between access rights and impermissible 
compulsion of expression.109  Post’s theory of expressive freedom rests 
on an eloquent account of a functioning democratic society’s need for 
open, robust communication.110  He indicts access rights as compromising 
essential First Amendment protection for his conception of public dis-
course, in which “democracy attempts to reconcile individual autonomy 
with collective self-determination by subordinating governmental deci-
sionmaking to communicative processes sufficient to instill in citizens a 
sense of participation, legitimacy, and identification.”111  All of these 
conceptions of expressive freedom appeal to the same democratic values 
that animate the case for access rights, and none openly venerates the 
economic market’s distribution of expressive opportunities. 
In addition to the nuanced rhetoric of their First Amendment theo-
ries, the progressive libertarians distance their attacks on access rights 
from those of the conservative libertarians by emphasizing what they por-
tray as an internal contradiction of the case for access rights.  All of the 
progressive libertarian theorists seek to drive a conceptual wedge be-
tween the two central goals of access rights: better public information and 
broader democratic participation.112  Redish posits the asserted dichotomy 
in the clearest terms, distinguishing “equality” of political participation 
from “enrichment” of public debate as justifications for access rights.113  
Post distinguishes between justifications for access rights that cast the 
state as “parliamentarian” and “teacher.”114  Sullivan likewise distin-
  
Outrageous Opinion). 
 107 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 
949, 959-65 (1995) (hereinafter Sullivan, Unfree Markets). 
 108 See REDISH, supra note [x], at 153-74. 
 109 See id. at 174-84. 
 110 For a useful introduction, see Post, Outrageous Opinion, supra note [x], at 626-46. 
 111 Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public 
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1115-16 (1993) (hereinafter Post, Meiklejohn’s Mis-
take).  For further development of Post’s concept of public discourse, see Robert Post, De-
mocracy and Equality, ANNALS OF AMER. ACAD. OF POL. SCI. (Jan. 2006) at 25-30; Post, 
Outrageous Opinion, supra note [x], at 633-38. 
 112 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (deriving information and participa-
tion goals from Barron’s case for access rights). 
 113 See REDISH, supra note [x], at 161-68 (discussing equality and enrichment ration-
ales). 
 114 See Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1528-34; see also Robert C. 
Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 187-90 (1996) (recapitulating argument in 
government subsidy context). 
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guishes “allocative” from “distributive or paternalistic” justifications.115  
This claimed discontinuity between improving informational quality and 
broadening participation enables the progressive libertarians to argue that 
access rights could improve public debate only if accompanied by unac-
ceptably elitist substantive prescriptions.116  Attacking the internal dy-
namics of the case for access rights enables the progressive libertarians to 
reject access rights without appearing to reject the normative priorities 
that access rights seek to advance. 
Behind their nuanced accounts of free speech and distinctive in-
ternal objections to access rights, however, the progressive libertarians 
actually embrace – as a constitutional if not a normative matter – all of 
the conservative libertarians’ central precepts.  First, the progressive lib-
ertarians echo the conservative libertarian dogma that the First Amend-
ment exists to protect personal autonomy against government interfer-
ence.  Without making autonomy quite the battle cry it is for the conser-
vatives, the progressive libertarians still attack access rights in defense of 
an individualist status quo.  Redish has constructed an imposing structure 
of First Amendment theory on the premise that constitutional speech pro-
tection exists solely to protect individual self-fulfillment.117  He espe-
cially recalls the conservative libertarians in focusing First Amendment 
protection on property used for expression – in his phrase, “the associa-
tional enterprise that operates the expressive resource.”118  Sullivan 
praises “[c]onventional First Amendment norms of individualism, relativ-
ism, and antipaternalism” and maintains that First Amendment principles 
“preclude a norm of equality of influence.”119  Both Redish and Sullivan 
join the conservative libertarians in painting a favorable picture of inter-
est group pluralism as a democratic model.120  Post suggests a different 
theoretical orientation by describing his First Amendment theory as 
aimed at facilitating democratic self-determination,121 but he conceptual-
izes democratic process values in a way that subordinates them to indi-
vidual autonomy values.  “Individual citizens,” he explains, “can identify 
  
 115 Sullivan, Unfree Markets, supra note [x], at 956. 
 116 Jack Balkin posits a similar dichotomy, although without a libertarian agenda, 
when he distinguishes populist and progressive tendencies in First Amendment thought.  
See J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 
1935 (1995) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note [x]) (herinafter Balkin, Popu-
lism). 
 117 See generally Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 
(1982). 
 118 REDISH, supra note [x], at 182 (footnote omitted).  Redish argues that the First 
Amendment should protect expressive property even when the owner has “no substantive 
message to convey [but is] interested primarily or exclusively in maximizing profits.”  Id. at 
189. 
 119 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 663, 673 (1997) (hereinafter Sullivan, Political Money). 
 120 See REDISH, supra note [x], at 171-72; Sullivan, Political Money, supra note [x], at 
680-82.  For discussion of the conservative libertarian rejection of civic republican ideas in 
favor of interest group pluralism, see supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
 121 See Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1521. 
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with the creation of a collective will only if they believe the collective 
decisionmaking is in some way connected to their own individual self-
determination.”122  Thus, he concludes, “[t]he enterprise of public dis-
course . . . rests on the value of autonomy.”123 
Second, and centrally, the progressive libertarians echo, albeit in 
subtler tones, the conservative libertarians’ belief in the market as the 
only constitutionally legitimate arbiter of expressive opportunities.  Post 
strikingly rejects doubts about the underpinnings of market distribution – 
the public-private distinction and the autonomous character of individual 
choices – not because he can defend either premise on its own terms but 
because he cannot conceptualize democratic self-determination without 
fully crediting both of them.124  “The ascription of autonomy,” he writes, 
is “the transcendental precondition for the possibility of democratic self-
determination.”125  Accordingly, he condemns as anathema to democracy 
any regulatory effort to alter market distributions.126  Redish maintains 
that the unregulated market gives all competing ideas a fair opportunity to 
influence debate and insists that altering the market’s distribution of ex-
pressive opportunities in any way would contradict the terms of democ-
racy by compromising self-determination.127  He also emphasizes a no-
tion of “epistemological humility” that treats market distributions as in-
herently legitimate while discrediting any questioning of private power as 
an impermissible appeal to “normative factors.”128  Sullivan endorses 
market distributions of expressive opportunities by avidly embracing the 
public-private distinction.129  Her avowed “differential distrust of gov-
  
 122 Id. at 1524; see also Post, Democracy, supra note [x], at 26 (arguing that “the prac-
tice of self-government” turns not on “making particular decisions” but rather on “recogniz-
ing particular decisions as one’s own”) (herinafter Post, Democracy). 
 123 Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note [x], at 1118-19; see also Post, Equality and 
Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1530 (emphasizing “the principle that the self-determining 
agency of all persons should be regarded with equal respect” as basis for rejecting efforts to 
equalize the distribution of expressive opportunities). 
 124 See Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note [x], at 1125-28 (discussing public-private 
distinction); id. at 1128-33 (discussing autonomous character of individual choices).  Post’s 
assertion that our deepening social science knowledge about cultural influences on behavior 
“is deeply incompatible with the very premise of democratic self-government,” id. at 1130, 
resonates with McGinnis’ similar doubt about the sustainability of democratic values.  See 
supra note ___.  
 125 Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note [x], at 1131 (emphasis added). 
 126 See id. at 1121; see also Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1530-31 
(characterizing access rights as impermissibly “repressing the speech of some in order to 
augment the speech of others”); id. at 1537 (charging that, under an access rights regime, 
“public discourse could no longer mediate between individual and collective self-
determination”). 
 127 See REDISH, supra note [x], at 163-64.  Redish defines “political equality” as requir-
ing only “governmental neutrality in the restriction of private expression” and dismisses the 
idea of substantive equality as unattainable.  Id. at 163. 
 128 Id. at 170. 
 129 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Resurrecting Free Speech, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 979-
82 (1995) (defending public-private distinction) (hereinafter Sullivan, Resurrecting); see also 
Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, supra note [x], at 207 (describing nongovernmental suppres-
sions of speech as “exercises of editorial discretion, market judgment, social responsibility, 
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ernment” reinforces the idea that the market distributes expressive oppor-
tunities neutrally130 and that egalitarian reforms would impermissibly 
alter that neutral distribution.131  The progressive libertarians join their 
conservative counterparts in presuming the market’s distribution of ex-
pressive opportunity to be an empirically reliable measure of people’s 
preferences132 while treating any uncertainty about access rights’ efficacy 
as reason enough to reject them.133 
Finally, the progressive libertarians echo the conservative liber-
tarian warning that any attempt to alter the market’s distribution of ex-
pressive opportunities amounts to statist tyranny.  Too polite to parrot 
Fried’s red-baiting,134 they nonetheless manage to make clear that access 
rights advocates are enemies of freedom.    Post claims that “efforts to 
equalize influence must involve both the equalization of ideas and the 
control of intimate and independent processes by which individuals 
evaluate ideas” and would therefore “verge on the tyrannical.”135  Sulli-
van characterizes access rights advocates as seeking authority for the 
state to “reorder[] our ideological preferences.”136  Redish likewise con-
cludes that an access rights regime would place the state “in a position to 
manipulate the flow of private debate on the basis of predetermined sub-
stantive considerations.”137  The progressive libertarians join the conser-
vatives in treating past governmental assaults on expressive freedom as 
conclusive proof that government cannot enhance expressive freedom.138  
  
or just plain taste”). 
 130 See Sullivan, Unfree Markets, supra note [x], at 961-62. 
 131 See Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, supra note [x], at 212-13 (critically describing egali-
tarian commitments of access rights advocates); see also Sullivan, Political Money, supra 
note [x], at 675 (describing expressive freedom as “a realm of inevitable inequality”). 
 132 See Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1536 n.38 (arguing for pre-
sumption of market distributions because “we typically do not have access” to “a perspective 
that is itself impervious to social circumstances”); Sullivan, Political Money, supra note [x], 
at 677 (denying the possibility of any baseline from which to measure distortion of political 
preferences); cf. supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing conservative liber-
tarians’ belief that market distributions accurately reflect preferences). 
 133 See REDISH, supra note [x], at 165-66 (offering assertion that “[t]he impact of a right 
of expressive access on the scope of public debate. . . is open to question” as a reason to 
reject access rights); Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1529 (questioning 
efficacy of regulatory efforts to improve public discourse); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against 
Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 322 (arguing that campaign finance 
reform’s ineffectuality as a redistributive device renders it impermissibly content-based); 
Sullivan, Resurrecting, supra note [x], at 986 (questioning capacity of government regula-
tion to improve upon socially constructed preconditions for expression); cf. supra notes ___-
___ and accompanying text (discussing conservative libertarians’ rejection of access rights 
based on practical doubts). 
 134 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
 135 Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1535; see also Post, Meiklejohn’s 
Mistake, supra note [x], at 1120 (equating access rights with censorship). 
 136 Sullivan, Resurrecting, supra note [x], at 987. 
 137 REDISH, supra note [x], at 150. 
 138 See REDISH, supra note [x], at 172-73 (recounting instances of governmental censor-
ship); Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note [x], at 1136 (equating “[s]tate intervention” 
with “[t]he nightmare vision of Michel Foucault”); Sullivan, Discrimination, supra note [x], 
 
 10/31/2006 7:45:25 AM 
  23 
Redish, amplifying the conservative libertarian charge that access rights 
front for left-wing policy preferences,139 would reject access rights be-
cause they resemble proposals for economic redistribution.140  Post and 
Sullivan sound a variation on this theme, claiming that the deliberative 
idea of democracy that undergirds access rights proposals would en-
trench, in Sullivan’s words, “a partisan and controversial substantive con-
ception of speech.”141 
Both Sullivan and Post nominally hedge their bets by carving out 
narrow spaces for permissible regulations related to speech.142  Sullivan 
distinguishes between laws that regulate “the activity of speaking” and 
those that regulate “the economic attributes of speaking, or in other words 
the literal markets in which ideas are commodified,” proclaiming the lat-
ter sort of regulation unproblematic under the First Amendment.143  Ac-
cordingly, she endorses media cross-ownership restrictions144 and “must 
carry” requirements imposed on cable systems.145  Post suggests that the 
government “might perhaps” treat some broadcast media as quasi-state 
actors146 and that campaign finance regulations might be tolerable “in the 
most unusual and limited of circumstances.”147  Neither of their allow-
ances, however, actually justifies any meaningful limits on market distri-
bution.  Sullivan’s constitutional suspicion of any effort to increase the 
“diversity or competitiveness” of public debate148 and of regulations de-
signed to serve the public interest149 effectively dooms cross-ownership 
  
at 450 (“[T]here is good reason in our free speech history to suspect that discretion (both 
legislative and judicial) will most frequently be exercised with a bias toward the governing 
status quo.”). 
 139 See supra note ___ and accompanying text. 
 140 See REDISH, supra note [x], at 151; see also id. at 168-71 (attempting to discredit 
access rights arguments as masking a substantive agenda of economic redistribution). 
 141 Sullivan, Discrimination, supra note [x], at 449; see also Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, 
supra note [x], at 1117 (claiming that a deliberative vision of expressive freedom is “ulti-
mately grounded upon a distinctive and controversial version of collective identity”); Sulli-
van, Campaign Finance, supra note [x], at 323 (arguing that justifying campaign finance 
reform on democratic process principles violates First Amendment). 
 142 Redish sticks to his hard line, considering but rejecting out of hand several nar-
rower versions of access rights.  See REDISH, supra note [x], at 184-90.  His sole answer to 
failings in the system of free expression is the promise of the Internet.  See id. at 190-92. 
 143 Sullivan, Unfree Markets, supra note [x], at 964; see also Sullivan, Intermediaries, 
supra note [x], at 1659 (explaining “Supreme Court’s deference to regulations that it can 
characterize as market-structuring rather than ideological”); Sullivan, Resurrecting, supra 
note [x], at 979-80.  
 144 See Sullivan, Discrimination, supra note [x], at 445 (distinguishing “markets in 
ideas” from “markets in products that convey ideas” as basis for endorsing media cross-
ownership restrictions). 
 145 See id. at 450-51 (characterizing “must carry” rules as promoting “diversity of com-
petitors, not enforced diversity of substantive views”); see also Sullivan, Intermediaries, 
supra note [x], at 1661-62. 
 146 Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1539. 
 147 Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note [x], at 1133. 
 148 Sullivan, Intermediaries, supra note [x], at 1661. 
 149 See id. at 1662. 
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restrictions or “must carry” rules if the government intends them to affect 
the quality or diversity of information available to the public – which is 
exactly why the government imposes any regulation on an informational 
market.  Post’s theoretical allowance for regulation is simply too hesitant, 
qualified, and grudging to have any discernible consequence.  Paradoxi-
cally, he suggests justifying speech regulations by narrowing his category 
of “public discourse,” which defines the very zone of democratic debate 
in which access rights find their justification.150 
 
C. The Failings of the Libertarian Critique  
 
Once the progressive libertarians’ nuanced rhetoric and subtle ar-
guments against access rights stand revealed as accessories to the familiar 
conservative libertarian equation of expressive freedom with market dis-
tribution, a single set of objections can answer the libertarian critique.  
The libertarians’ constitutional case for reserving distribution of eco-
nomic opportunities to the economic marketplace, and thus rejecting ac-
cess rights, fails on three levels: empirical, theoretical, and normative.  I 
will briefly set forth the principal objections that are most salient and 
decisive in the context of Barron’s case for access rights. 
On an empirical level, critical analysis forecloses the foundational 
libertarian premise that any departure from market distributions of ex-
pressive opportunities contradicts authentic audience preferences.  In 
general, information is an extremely difficult good to commodify, be-
cause information by definition is unknown until it is acquired.151  If the 
market excludes from the airwaves a speaker whose position the audience 
has not heard, and whose existence may not even be known to the audi-
ence, then the market cannot be enforcing an audience preference to ex-
clude her.  In the particular context of the mass media, C. Edwin Baker 
has built a watertight case against uncritical reliance on market principles, 
even assuming those principles apply to other goods.  Baker emphasizes 
numerous ways in which special characteristics of media products – in-
cluding substantial public good characteristics, significant positive and 
negative externalities, and accountability to the dual demands of audi-
  
 150 See Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], at 1539 (stating that boundaries of 
“public discourse” are “negotiable” and that “much regulation outside that arena is . . . con-
stitutionally unproblematic”) (footnote omitted).  This notion is especially curious given 
Post’s concession that “[t]here is obviously no theoretically neutral way” to define the 
boundaries of public discourse.  Post, Outrageous Opinion, supra note [x], at 671. 
 151 This problem correlates with Arrow’s information paradox, which holds that sellers 
of information, in order to persuade potential buyers of the information’s value, may have to 
reveal the information and thus diminish or destroy its value.  See Kenneth J. Arrow, Eco-
nomic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF 
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-16 (1962).  Information in 
this sense also constitutes a sort of “experience good,” because audiences have difficulty 
assessing information’s value prior to receiving it.  See Philip Nelson, Information and 
Consumer Behavior, 78(2) J. OF POL. ECONOMY 311 (1970) (explaining concept of experience 
goods). 
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ences and advertisers – can distort the market relationship between con-
sumers’ preferences and media companies’ delivery of content.152  The 
market’s commodification of information, and the background legal rules 
against which the market necessarily operates, tend to influence the pref-
erences people express.153  The market’s reliance on consumers’ ability 
and willingness to pay necessarily overemphasizes the preferences of 
wealthier consumers, an emphasis that requires normative justification.154  
The market can measure only those preferences expressed through pur-
chase decisions, a measurement that ignores people’s preferences for 
other expressions of preference and that artificially favors preferences 
that the market itself substantively influences.155  Baker’s analysis ex-
plodes the libertarian fiction that market distributions embody human 
freedom and that any redistribution of expressive opportunities therefore 
undermines liberty.156 
On a theoretical level, the libertarian critics’ case for informa-
tional markets depends on a formalistic and underdeveloped distinction 
between public and private authorities.157  Libertarian critics inevitably 
invoke the sorry history of government censorship as if it inherently re-
futed the case for access rights,158 without considering the burdens that 
concentrations of market power impose on people’s freedom to speak and 
to receive information.  Libertarians exacerbate their theoretical fallacy 
by cloaking their defenses of powerful institutions’ expressive primacy in 
the inapposite rhetoric of “individual” or “personal” autonomy,159 sub-
  
 152 See BAKER, supra note [x], at 7-121. 
 153 See id. at 64-71. 
 154 See id. at 71-80. 
 155 See id. at 80-93. 
 156 The failure of the libertarian account of preferences discredits libertarians’ frequent 
conflation of access rights advocates’ contention that collective processes necessarily influ-
ence individuals’ preferences with a paternalistic desire to impose particular preferences.  
See Gey, supra note [x], at 212 (ascribing to access rights advocates the belief that “govern-
ment should seek to cure the dissenters of their misguided attitudes”); Yoo, Rise and De-
mise, supra note [x], at 323 (claiming that access rights advocates “regard[] the individual’s 
personality as a social construct improvable by the state”).  In fact, as Baker suggests, liber-
tarians themselves engage in paternalism when they reduce people’s preferences to only 
what the market can measure, see BAKER, supra note [x], at 83-84, and when they seek to 
place the media beyond popular control.  See id. at 121. 
 157 For a discussion of conceptual problems with the public-private distinction, see 
Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and Nongov-
ernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 135-46 
(2004) (hereinafter Magarian, Public-Private Distinction). 
 158 See Fried, supra note [x], at 226; Gey, supra note [x], at 278; Yoo, Rise and Demise, 
supra note [x], at 338. 
 159 See, e.g., REDISH, supra note [x], at 182 (emphasizing democratic value of “personal 
intellectual autonomy”); Fried, supra note [x], at 234 (“The paradigmatic free speech case is 
one in which government prevents a person from speaking or punishes him for having spo-
ken . . . .”); Gey, supra note [x], at 274-75 (asserting that “government regulation of speech 
continues to deal with a highly individualistic phenomenon”); McGinnis, supra note [x], at 
57 (claiming to advocate a theory “in which the First Amendment protects the individual’s 
right to transmit his information”); Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note [x], at 1130-31 
(focusing autonomy-based First Amendment theory on individual citizens); Yoo, Rise and 
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merging the complex power relationships that enmesh flesh-and-blood 
individuals, government institutions, and nongovernmental institutions.  I 
have contended that courts should understand the First Amendment, at 
least in times of war and national emergency, as fully safeguarding the 
expressive autonomy of natural persons, in order to preserve the essential 
space within which we generate and evaluate ideas, but as shielding pri-
vate institutions’ autonomy only to the extent it instrumentally serves the 
paramount First Amendment value of collective self-determination.160  
For libertarians, expressive freedom simply means a guarantee against 
any alteration in the regulatory status quo that necessarily shapes market 
relationships, regardless of where that status quo leaves the informational 
quality and participatory character of public discourse.  Their theory 
promises meaningful freedom but delivers only a flimsy abstraction, un-
moored to any principle save protecting the expressive entitlements of the 
market’s winners. 
Beyond these empirical and theoretical concerns, libertarians’ re-
liance on economic markets to distribute expressive opportunities pre-
sents massive normative problems.  The libertarian analysis simply sub-
stitutes blind fealty to the market for any consideration of the value 
judgments that necessarily underlie any policy choice, including laissez-
faire distribution of expressive opportunities.161  The central normative 
problem with the libertarian critique arises from the mass media’s unique 
power to inform and influence democratic deliberation, providing oppor-
tunities for a wide range of people to participate in public debate and giv-
ing most members of the political community their most important source 
of access to diverse perspectives and information on important controver-
sies.  If the media distributes access inequitably or presents only a limited 
range of viewpoints on issues of public concern, then public discourse 
suffers serious damage that may in turn undermine democratic self-
government.162  Constitutional speech protection serves, at least in sub-
  
Demise, supra note [x], at 331 (describing state action doctrine in terms of “the relationship 
between the individual and the state”).  Redish defends the expressive rights of powerful 
institutions based on the premise that institutions have feelings too.  See REDISH, supra 
note [x], at 180 (crediting “large media outlet(s)” with capacity for “cognitive dissonance, 
public humiliation, and personal demoralization”). 
 160 See Magarian, Public-Private Distinction, supra note [x], at 149-50. 
 161 Baker has captured the essence of the problem: “The most important and difficult 
tasks for law and legal scholarship are to understand, interpret, and reason about values 
and normative visions – and for this, economics is largely irrelevant.”  C. Edwin Baker, 
Media Structure, Ownership Policy, and the First Amendment, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 747 
(2005) (hereinafter Baker, Media Structure). 
 162 Post argues, to the contrary, that distributive justice concerns fundamentally con-
tradict democratic values, because the substantive democratic commitment to self-
government necessarily transcends any baseline of distributive justice.  See Post, Democ-
racy, supra note [x], at 28-30.  Democracy, on his account, requires not substantive equality 
but rather “equality of agency” to participate in public discourse.  Id. at 29.  Expressive 
freedom confers that equality of agency by “permit[ting] persons to speak in the ways, man-
ner, and circumstances of their choosing.”  Id.  Thus, government regulations that impede 
speakers’ choices violate democratic precepts.  See id. at 29-30.  Oddly, despite his acknowl-
edgement that government sometimes must ameliorate material inequalities in order to 
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stantial part, to ensure open and effective democratic debate.  Libertari-
ans’ insistence that courts should subordinate that constitutional value to 
the vagaries of profit motives and demand curves – indeed, that courts 
must do so – turns our democratic system on its head. 
The progressive libertarian attack on the compatibility of access 
rights’ two primary goals, broadening participation and improving de-
bate,163 appears to furnish a logical riposte to access rights advocates’ 
normative complaint that market distributions disserve democracy.  If we 
have no good reason to believe that equalizing access to media would 
improve public debate, the progressive libertarians ask, then how can we 
justify departing from the market status quo?  Like other libertarian ar-
guments against access rights, however, this argument rests on nothing 
more than a normative belief in the constitutional sanctity of market dis-
tributions.  If the economic market produces the only distribution of ex-
pressive opportunities consistent with a proper understanding of the First 
Amendment, then any absence of a speaker or idea from public debate 
must amount to an efficient exclusion of irrelevant information, and alter-
ing the market’s distributive scheme could not possibly improve the qual-
ity of debate.164  The case for access rights, however, depends on a differ-
ent normative account of the relationship between participation and in-
formation.  Ingrained in the case for access rights is confidence in the 
ability of an engaged polity to generate productive debate, with broader 
participation producing a wider and more informative range of ideas for 
the community to evaluate.165  That optimistic egalitarian premise, in my 
view, resonates far more clearly than libertarians’ harsh social Darwinism 
with our ideals and aspirations for participatory democracy.166 
The danger of which libertarian critics most loudly warn is not 
that access rights will fail to make democratic debate more informative 
and inclusive but that any attempt to do so will censor speech and steer 
debate toward favored substantive results.167  This authoritarian smear 
makes for bombastic rhetorical theater, but it has nothing to do with Bar-
  
sustain democratic legitimacy, see id. at 33, Post never explains how his formal vision of 
expressive freedom can foster democratically legitimate discourse when some people can 
indulge their choices to participate in materially expensive forms of persuasion while others 
cannot. 
 163 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
 164 Conservative libertarians, of course, openly condemn access rights advocates’ ap-
peals to distributive justice concerns.  See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.  For 
a thorough and eloquent defense of distributive justice in the context of media access, see 
BAKER, supra note [x], at 71-80. 
 165 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing Barron’s linkage be-
tween access rights’ informational benefits for the general public and participatory benefits 
for marginalized speakers). 
 166 Indeed, the assumption that greater inclusiveness serves the instrumental ends of 
democracy has become integral to our constitutional order.  See Morton J. Horwitz, Fore-
word: The Constitution of Change; Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 30, 63-64 (1993) (discussing Warren Court’s reconciliation of protecting mi-
nority rights with advancing democratic values). 
 167 See supra notes ___, ___ and accompanying text. 
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ron’s evenhanded, substantively neutral formulation of access rights.168  
To some extent the discontinuity between Barron’s case for access rights 
and libertarians’ attacks may result from the louder echo in libertarian 
ears of Professors Fiss and Sunstein’s more recent appeals for access 
rights.  Writing during the relative political calm of the 1980s and early 
1990s, Fiss and Sunstein displayed less concern than Barron about imme-
diate threats to political dissent and arguably placed greater emphasis on 
advancing their substantive social visions.169   Nonetheless, libertarian 
critics’ blatant disregard of the procedural case for access rights reflects 
both a methodologically careless inattention to Barron and a sad incapac-
ity to imagine any constitutional world between the paradise of laissez-
faire capitalism and the inferno of the absolutist state.  To the extent lib-
ertarians bother to engage the procedural case for access rights, they in-
sist that access rights, even if substantively neutral, would court tyranny 
by requiring, in Fried’s phrase, “equality of results” among different 
speakers who seek to influence public debate.170   That assertion, how-
ever, presumes an absolutist posture that no advocate of access rights has 
ever taken.  Any effort to make access to important social goods more 
egalitarian requires ongoing assessment of what “equality” requires and 
to what extent equalization should supersede competing social values. 
The political theory behind the libertarian critique poses a final 
normative problem.  Libertarians treat interest group pluralism, and the 
vision of autonomy it spawns, not merely as the best explanation of how 
politics should work but rather as the only explanation consistent with a 
meaningful account of expressive freedom.171  In contrast, arguments for 
access rights usually, although not necessarily, resonate with civic repub-
  
 168 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.  Redish tacitly acknowledges Bar-
ron’s procedural approach, grudgingly conceding that “not all commentators who have 
urged the creation of a right of access appear to advocate a seemingly process-based expres-
sive redistribution as little more than a procedural means to achieve the substantive end of 
economic justice.”  REDISH, supra note [x], at 169.  Astonishingly, that quotation comes from 
a longer sentence.  For a writer as articulate as Redish to torture the language so grue-
somely betrays something – in this case, that he can raise no persuasive argument against 
Barron’s forthrightly procedural theory of access rights. 
 169 See, e.g., Fiss, State Activism, supra note [x], at 2100 (advocating role for state as 
“high-minded parliamentarian”); SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note [x], at 17-23 (advanc-
ing Madisonian vision of democracy).  If one reads Fiss and Sunstein fairly, however, their 
commitments to substantive freedom of expression become obvious.  See, e.g., Fiss, Social 
Structure, supra note [x], at 1421 (advocating process norms for speech protection and dis-
avowing direction of substantive outcomes); SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra, at 35 (emphasiz-
ing dangers of speech regulation and stating that government should never regulate view-
point or quality of conent). 
 170 Fried, supra note [x], at 230; see also Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note [x], 
at 1534 (ascribing to access rights advocates the position “that the state be required af-
firmatively to ensure that all persons exercise equal influence on public discourse”); id. at 
1537 (asserting that access rights proposals require “allotting speech in precisely equal 
portions”). 
 171 See supra notes ___-___, ___-___ and accompanying text (discussing libertarian 
critics’ commitment to interest group pluralism). 
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lican principles.172  Access rights advocates posit a need for the political 
community to debate openly and actively about the issues of public im-
portance, including the proper policy balance between the values of 
equality and autonomy.  The idea of access rights makes no internal sense 
if political values are not constantly subject to debate and the political 
order open to revision.  Thus, to the extent access rights rest on civic re-
publican premises, those premises – and, indeed, all facets of access 
rights – must remain constantly open to debate.  Libertarians, on the other 
hand, seek to entrench an uncontestable pluralist account of democracy 
by reifying market distributions of expressive opportunities.173  From the 
perspective of market triumphalism, the idea that democratic ideals might 
cause us to favor redistribution of expressive opportunities is the only 
political idea we may not consider. 
 
  III. THE REGULATORY REFORM CRITIQUE OF ACCESS    
  RIGHTS 
 
The other critique of access rights, which I call the regulatory re-
form critique, embraces “access” but not “rights.”  The first section of 
this part describes the regulatory reform position.  Like Barron and his 
successors, regulatory reformers believe the market inequitably distrib-
utes important forms of expressive access, particularly access to the me-
dia.  Also like the access rights advocates, regulatory reformers believe 
government can and should work to solve the problem of inequitable dis-
tribution.  The regulatory reformers, however, substantially accept as a 
descriptive matter the libertarian premise that the First Amendment pro-
tects the autonomy of private actors, and they distrust courts as agents of 
social reform.  Accordingly, they would narrow the scope of the First 
Amendment, in order to allow the elected branches of government to dis-
tribute expressive opportunities more equitably.  The second section criti-
cizes the regulatory reformers’ institutional prescription.  The elected 
branches, notwithstanding the regulatory reformers’ serene confidence in 
their value for broadening media access, labor under a set of electoral 
pathologies that generally fray elected officials’ accountability to the 
people and particularly exclude the expressive interests of poor and so-
cially marginalized speakers from elected officials’ political calculations.  
In contrast, the First Amendment presents the most theoretically coherent 
and normatively appealing basis for broadening expressive access, and 
courts’ capacity to apply the First Amendment to access disputes makes 
them the optimal arbiters of an access rights regime. 
  
 172 Compare Magarian, Political Parties, supra note [x], at 1980-82 (discussing affinity 
between republican political theory and First Amendment theory that accommodates access 
rights) with Stephen A. Gardbaum, Broadcasting, Democracy, and the Market, 82 GEO. L.J. 
373, 382-88 (1993) (critiquing civic republican emphasis on consensus and making case for 
access rights based on expansive conception of autonomy). 
 173 Ironically, libertarians repeatedly accuse access rights advocates of seeking to en-
trench a civic republican political theory.  See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
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A. The Regulatory Reform Critique’s Theoretical Grounding 
and Institutional Logic 
 
C. Edwin Baker has articulated the most thorough regulatory re-
form approach to the media access problem.  Baker’s core First Amend-
ment theory resembles that of the libertarians, because he steadfastly as-
serts personal autonomy as the core value protected by the Free Speech 
Clause.174  Baker, however, takes a distinctive and nuanced approach to 
the autonomy theory, critically evaluating different entities’ autonomy 
claims175 and subordinating autonomy to democratic values in the particu-
lar contexts of electoral speech176 and the media.177  He contends that the 
instrumental interests of a healthy democracy, and not the autonomy in-
terests of speakers, should dictate First Amendment protection in those 
areas.178  Baker criticizes the mass media as “too timid in exposing cor-
ruption and abuse both of public and especially of private power, insuffi-
ciently diverse in its presentations, relatively unresponsive to significant 
elements of society and more encouraging of political passivity than pub-
lic involvement.”179  He strongly objects to First Amendment theories 
that treat media institutions as primary subjects of rights or limit the 
scope of democratic concern to efficient pricing of media products.180  
However, he rejects the idea of constitutionally mandated media access 
rights, because he believes courts lack both the authority to make norma-
tive judgments about what democratic values the press should serve at 
any given time181 and the competence to make empirical judgments about 
  
 174 Baker articulates and defends his “liberty model” of expressive freedom in C. Edwin 
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964 (1978) 
(hereinafter Baker, Scope). 
 175 Baker has argued that commercial entities lack the autonomy interest necessary to 
assert a First Amendment claim because the market, and not the commercial speaker’s 
conscience, dictates the content of commercial expression.  See generally C. Edwin Baker, 
Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976). 
 176 See C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 1 (1998) (hereinafter Baker, Campaign Expenditures). 
 177 Baker’s major recent statements on expressive freedom and the press include 
BAKER, supra note [x]; Baker, Media Structure, supra note [x]; Baker, Media Concentration, 
supra note [x]. 
 178 See C. Edwin Baker, Private Power, the Press, and the Constitution, 10 CONST. 
COMM. 421, 436 (1993) (distinguishing relative importance of autonomy values and instru-
mental democratic considerations in speech and press contexts) (hereinafter Baker, Private 
Power); Baker, Campaign Expenditures, supra note [x], at 28-29 (characterizing elections as 
“institutionally bound” and measures that constrain electoral speech thus appropriate “to 
assure the fairness and openness of elections”) (footnote omitted). 
 179 Baker, Private Power, supra note [x], at 426. 
 180 See Baker, Media Concentration, supra note [x], at 854-60. 
 181 See BAKER, supra note [x], at 212-13 (advocating regime of constitutional space for 
media regulation pursuant to Baker’s preferred democratic model of “complex democracy”); 
Baker, Private Power, supra note [x], at 439 (questioning appropriateness of judicial deter-
minations about how press should serve democratic values). 
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the proper shape of access measures.182  Accordingly, he posits a First 
Amendment “nonmandate”183 under which courts should uphold regula-
tions that enhance media access, with particular solicitude for structural 
regulations of media ownership.184  Baker’s conception of elections as 
discursively limited constructs for converting public opinion into political 
power similarly leads him to advocate constitutional allowance for regu-
lations of electoral speech that would make electoral debate more partici-
patory and informed.185  
Jack Balkin has followed a circuitous intellectual path to arrive at 
his regulatory reform orientation.  In an early treatment of the access is-
sue, in 1990, Balkin perhaps more closely tracked Barron’s case for ac-
cess rights than any scholar before or since.  He argued then that the idea 
of democratic pluralism had come unmoored from its legal realist roots, 
resulting in a First Amendment doctrine of formal equality that ignored 
crucial inequalities in access to means of expression.186  As a remedy for 
this ideological drift, he advocated a substantive understanding of the 
First Amendment as requiring access rights, to be secured in the first in-
stance by judicial enforcement.187  In a more recent commentary, how-
ever, Balkin argues that the growth of the Internet must alter our concep-
tion of expressive freedom in fundamental ways.188  While he disavows 
the technological optimist credo that the Internet will solve all distribu-
tional problems,189 he nonetheless argues that the Internet’s democratiz-
ing effects on public discourse should shift our attention from equality to 
autonomy and from problems of access to problems of censorship.190  He 
also urges a shift in our institutional conception of expressive freedom, 
  
 182 See BAKER, supra note [x], at 199 (questioning judicial competence to make empiri-
cal determinations about effectuating access); Baker, Private Power, supra note [x], at 439 
(same). 
 183 BAKER, supra note [x], at 199. 
 184 See Baker, Media Concentration, supra note [x], at 905-06 (contending that healthy 
democracy requires substantial dispersion of opportunities to influence public opinion). 
 185 See Baker, Campaign Expenditures, supra note [x], at 33-37. 
 186 See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the 
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 387-94 (hereinafter Balkin, Realism) (explaining 
development of libertarian aspects of First Amendment doctrine in terms of democratic 
pluralism). 
 187 See id. at 412-13. 
 188 See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note [x]. 
 189 See id. at 31-32 (explaining why we should not expect Internet to solve problems of 
media diversity); cf. supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text (contesting technological 
optimist arguments against access rights). 
 190 See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note [x], at 43-45 (arguing for renewed emphasis 
on liberty in free speech theory).  Balkin ascribes to technological developments perhaps a 
larger portion of his theoretical evolution than they can plausibly explain.  He does not 
make clear, for example, why changes in communications technology should make popular 
culture more important in First Amendment theory than it was before.  See id. at 34-35 
(advocating shift away from government and toward culture as object of free speech con-
cern).  Some of Balkin’s new ideas seem more plausibly rooted in his intellectual engage-
ment with populism and critique of progressivism.  See generally Balkin, Populism, supra 
note [x]. 
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from a focus on judicial protection to a greater emphasis on the elected 
branches of government and technological developments in the private 
sector as guarantors of expressive freedom.191  Although Balkin does not 
explicitly repudiate his earlier call for access rights, his new analysis em-
phasizes only the negative sense of the First Amendment and strongly 
downplays the efficacy of judicially enforced expressive freedom. 
Mark Tushnet does not address access rights proposals directly 
but offers an alternative, contrary First Amendment vision responsive to 
the same concerns that underlie Barron’s analysis.  Tushnet sees in con-
temporary free speech doctrine a lamentable but intractable fixation on 
protecting the rights of the powerful.192  Accordingly, in constitutional 
law generally and the free speech context in particular, he holds out little 
hope for judicially imposed progressive change.  In his farthest reaching 
argument about institutional approaches to constitutional law, Tushnet 
advocates a regime in which robust notions of constitutional rights persist 
but the people, acting through political processes, supplant judges as the 
principal arbiters of constitutional values.193  In a milder variation on that 
argument, he advocates a process of “weak form judicial review,” under 
which constitutional doctrine would develop over time through judicial-
legislative interaction on novel or unsettled constitutional issues.194  He 
illustrates this process with what calls the “managerial model” of free 
speech, under which courts defer to regulations that the legislature be-
lieves “increase the availability of expression – net, or on balance.”195  
Without providing a full assessment of the managerial model, Tushnet 
points out its manifestation in cases upholding cable “must carry” rules, 
campaign finance regulations, and extensions of copyright protections.196  
Tushnet acknowledges that the Court usually practices a stronger brand of 
judicial review that constrains legislative initiatives to expand expressive 
opportunities,197 but he suggests that weak form judicial review, as exem-
plified by the managerial model, would provide a normatively desirable 
basis for regulatory efforts to enhance expressive freedom. 
The regulatory reformers’ simultaneous support for egalitarian 
government initiatives and skepticism about constitutionally driven 
  
 191 See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note [x], at 51-54 (arguing for shift in focus from 
judicial protection of free speech rights to legislative, administrative, and technological 
protection of free speech values). 
 192 See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 314 (2005) (noting “[t]he emergence of conservative free speech abso-
lutism on the Rehnquist Court”); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM 
THE COURTS 161 (1999) (criticizing free speech doctrine for underprotecting speech critical 
of government while ignoring distributional inequalities) (hereinafter TUSHNET, AWAY 
FROM THE COURTS). 
 193 See generally TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note [x]. 
 194 See generally Mark Tushnet, Weak-Form Judicial Review and “Core” Civil Liberties, 
41 HARV. CIV. R.-CIV. L. L. REV. 1 (2006) (hereinafter Tushnet, Weak-Form Review). 
 195 Id. at 12. 
 196 See id. at 13-16. 
 197 See id. at 3-4 (discussing Rehnquist Court’s defense of strong-form judicial review). 
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change appears to reflect the complicated inspiration of the New Deal and 
legal realism.  The New Deal has strongly influenced those normative 
premises of access rights that the regulatory reformers most obviously 
embrace: the desire for more informative and fully participatory public 
debate and the concern with achieving just distributions of expressive 
opportunities.198  The regulatory reformers also echo access rights advo-
cates’ quintessentially realist insight that the public-private distinction is 
a normative construct rather than an inevitable and conceptually organic 
precondition for freedom.199  On the other hand, the regulatory reform 
position exemplifies the New Deal appetite for politically driven reform 
and disdain for judicial interference with regulatory initiatives.200  The 
regulatory reformers’ prescription for legislative and administrative ac-
tion to expand access to the means of expression entails a high degree of 
confidence in the elected branches, although regulatory reformers provide 
few affirmative grounds for that confidence.  Tushnet, the regulatory re-
former who most thoroughly defends a greater role for elected officials in 
constitutional interpretation, can only argue that judicial dominance of 
constitutional law precludes any confident judgment that elected officials 
cannot handle constitutional questions,201 while elected officials’ general 
incentives would not necessarily stop them from protecting constitutional 
rights.202 Conversely, regulatory reformers manifest severe doubts about 
courts’ ability to achieve positive change by applying the First Amend-
ment to inequalities of access.  Those doubts, which define the regulatory 
reform critique of access rights, have two distinct dimensions: one relat-
ing to the First Amendment’s substantive underpinnings, the other relat-
ing to courts’ institutional attributes.203   
  
 198 For evidence of the New Deal’s importance in shaping arguments for access rights, 
see SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note [x], at 28-38 (advocating “a New Deal for Speech”); 
Balkin, Realism, supra note [x], at 388-91 (tying instrumental, egalitarian theory of rights 
to judicial revolution of 1937); Fiss, Why the State?, supra note [x], at 781 (invoking New 
Deal in support of proposals for government regulation to improve public debate). 
 199 See Baker, Private Power, supra note [x], at 422 (“[T]he real question [about state 
action] is always a matter of a substantive interpretation of constitutional norms.”); Balkin, 
Realism, supra note [x], at 412 (advocating abandonment of rigid public-private distinction 
in free speech context); Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court and Its First Amendment Con-
stituency, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 898 (1993) (critically analyzing role of public-private dis-
tinction in setting cognizable range of constitutional claims). 
 200 Tushnet expressly attributes his doubts about judicial protection of speech to the 
New Deal paradigm.  See Mark Tushnet, The Culture(s) of Free Expression, 76 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1106, 1114 & n.27 (1991) (reviewing STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 
DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990)) (hereinafter Tushnet, Culture(s)).   Of course, as 
Tushnet has acknowledged, the New Deal’s redistributive revolution also benefited from 
judicial action, particularly of expressive opportunities.  See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN AND 
MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 120 
(1996) (discussing Supreme Court’s early public forum cases). 
 201 See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note [x], at 57-65 (discussing predic-
tive problems caused by “judicial overhang’). 
 202 See id. at 65-70. 
 203 Those libertarian critics of access rights who address institutional considerations 
dismiss the idea of judicial implementation with little or no analysis.  See REDISH, supra 
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The regulatory reformers’ objection to judicially mandated access 
rights turns, first, on their First Amendment theory.  Although regulatory 
reformers largely share access rights proponents’ normative view that 
redistribution of expressive opportunities would benefit society, they ac-
tually view the First Amendment in a manner consistent with the liber-
tarians.  As discussed above, access rights advocates construe the First 
Amendment as an instrument for achieving effective debate; libertarians, 
in contrast, object to access rights based on their belief that the First 
Amendment simply prevents the government from compromising the ex-
pressive autonomy of people who possess the means to speak and be 
heard.  Regulatory reformers, although advocating access enhancements, 
tend to agree with libertarians as a descriptive matter that the First 
Amendment substantially serves to protect expressive autonomy.204  
Regulatory reformers’ disagreement with libertarians about the constitu-
tionality of access-enhancing regulations boils down to a dispute about 
how much territory the Amendment’s protective force should cover.  Lib-
ertarians believe in a strong First Amendment; regulatory reformers be-
lieve in a weaker First Amendment that neither provides any guarantee of 
access rights nor impedes the elected branches from redistributing access. 
The second dimension of regulatory reformers’ skepticism about 
courts’ role in broadening expressive access is institutional.  Regulatory 
reform arguments, reflecting widespread mistrust in the legal academy 
about judges as agents of progressive social change,205 cast doubt on 
courts’ ability to enhance marginalized speakers’ media access under the 
First Amendment.  The regulatory reformers emphasize courts’ persistent 
failures to advance progressive free speech values, 206 but as Tushnet ac-
knowledges, one branch’s shortcomings do not suffice to justify dislodg-
ing its authority.207  Just as the regulatory reformers offer few particular 
reasons to favor the elected branches as vehicles for access reform, they 
  
note [x], at 174 (dismissing judiciary’s capacity to administer access rights because of its 
asserted failings in other First Amendment contexts); McGinnis, supra note [x], at 124-25 
(asserting unnamed judicial “biases” and presuming inability of courts to assess access 
claims under “neutral principles”); see also Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note [x], at 325-26 
(arguing that access rights proposals are unworkable). 
 204 See Balkin, Realism, supra note [x], at 385 (including autonomy among values 
served by First Amendment); Tushnet, Culture(s), supra note [x], at 1107-10 (sympatheti-
cally analyzing eclectic theory of First Amendment that incorporates autonomy concerns).  
Autonomy stands at the center of Baker’s normative free speech theory, although he puts 
greater emphasis on democratic process values in the contexts of media and electoral regu-
lations.  See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
 205 See generally Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of 
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002). 
 206 See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note [x], at 129-33 (discussing con-
servative tilt of recent free speech decisions); Baker, Media Concentration, supra note [x], at 
848-55 (discussing conservative tilt in recent First Amendment decisions on media owner-
ship); Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note [x], at 19-21 (discussing present judicial equation 
of speech with property in telecommunications policy disputes). 
 207 “The real question is whether in general legislatures or courts make more, and more 
important, constitutional mistakes.”  TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note [x], at 
57. 
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provide little to substantiate their low opinion of courts.  Tushnet’s exten-
sive critique of judicial review concludes that courts generally do no 
more than reinforce the prevailing political order.208  Baker suggests, 
without going into detail, that “[c]onstitutional adjudication is poorly 
designed for crafting appropriate structural rules and media subsidies.”209   
Balkin takes a similar view, with particular reference to the complexities 
of advanced information technologies, in a similarly terse but sweeping 
manner.210  The regulatory reformers’ objection to judicial review may 
depend less on particular failings of courts than on the regulatory reform-
ers’ normative visions of institutional design.  Balkin’s and Tushnet’s 
preference for a politically rather than judicially driven constitutional 
order corresponds with their aspirations toward greater political popu-
lism.211  Baker expresses the same preference, albeit limited to the con-
text of media regulation.212    
 
B. Courts, the Elected Branches, and Access Rights: The 
Failings of the Regulatory Reform Critique 
 
The regulatory reform critique depends on two complementary 
premises, both of which I believe contain useful insights but ultimately 
lead them to the wrong conclusion.  First, regulatory reformers assert that 
legislators and regulators have the capacity and will to implement access 
reforms.  That assertion ignores pathologies of our present electoral sys-
tem that severely undermine the elected branches’ incentives to pursue 
more informative and participatory public debate.  Those pathologies take 
on added importance because they embody exactly the sort of failures of 
political debate that led Barron to advocate access rights.  Second, regula-
tory reformers treat constitutional rights as a theoretical dead end, and 
courts as an institutional albatross, in the quest for more egalitarian ac-
cess to public debate.  Those views underestimate both the First Amend-
ment’s theoretical value for framing access interests and courts’ utility for 
implementing a meaningful regime of access rights. 
 
 
 
 
  
 208 See id. at 152-53 (arguing that judicial deviations from prevailing political trends 
amount to random alterations with minimal normative consequences in the aggregate). 
 209 BAKER, supra note [x], at 199. 
 210 See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note [x], at 53-54. 
 211 See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note [x], at 177-94 (defending theory 
of “populist constitutional law”); Balkin, Populism, supra note [x], at 1985-90 (extolling 
virtues of populist satisfaction with sporadic political engagement as opposed to “elitist” 
preoccupation with ordinary politics).  
 212 See BAKER, supra note [x], at 213 (“[T]he Press Clause should be read to allow the 
government to promote a press that, in its best judgment, democracy needs but that the 
market fails to provide.”). 
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1. The Implications of Electoral Pathologies for  
 Legislative and Regulatory Access Reforms 
 
Regulatory reformers, like access rights advocates, aspire to a 
more egalitarian distribution of opportunities to participate, and a broader 
range of ideas present, in public debate.  Unlike access rights advocates, 
however, regulatory reformers place their faith in elected officials213 to 
accomplish that distribution.  Unfortunately, several prominent features 
of our electoral system discourage legislative and regulatory access initia-
tives.  Some of those problems are permanent and inherent to the system 
but not fatal to the access rights agenda.  Others are distinctive to our 
present political climate and, I believe, more toxic to hopes for legislative 
and regulatory access reforms.  First, several pivotal restrictions on elec-
toral competition operate to make elected officials unaccountable to their 
constituents.  To the extent access reforms would serve a general interest 
in broadening public debate, these pathologies of unaccountability re-
move elected officials’ incentives to advance that interest.  Second, eco-
nomically and socially marginalized members of the political community 
continue to face several formidable barriers to electoral participation.  To 
the extent access reforms would serve to open opportunities for such peo-
ple to participate in public debate, these pathologies of exclusion leave 
elected officials especially unmotivated to advance that interest.  Beyond 
their destructive effects on elected officials’ motivation to implement 
access reforms, all of these electoral pathologies underscore Barron’s 
case for access rights in an even more direct way: each substantially di-
minishes the quality and openness of electoral debate. 
 
a.  Inherent Disincentives to Access Reforms 
 
Public choice theory suggests one set of obstacles to legislative 
and regulatory access reforms: Elected officials typically act to advance 
their own self-interest, particularly the interest in holding on to power,214 
and powerful and well-organized interest groups can capture them.215  
These factors place two permanent, inherent obstacles in the path of ac-
cess reforms.  First, they create a strong disincentive for elected officials 
to impose reforms that would alter the status quo by bringing new voices 
and ideas into public debate.  Second, and more ominous, they raise the 
danger that elected officials, if granted the power to distribute expressive 
opportunities, will abuse that power to advance their own interests or 
  
 213 This discussion uses the term “elected officials” as shorthand for the full range of 
policymakers within the legislative and executive branches of the federal government.  
Although state elected officials have some capacity to impose access reforms and face some 
of the electoral pathologies I discuss in this section, I follow the regulatory reformers in 
focusing my attention on the federal government’s appetite for access reforms. 
 214 See generally DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974). 
 215 See, e.g., Peter Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 69 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1 (1982). 
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those of capturing interest groups. 
These obstacles warrant some concern, but we should not over-
emphasize them.  As to the disincentive concern, elected officials in the 
past have implemented access reforms, including limits on political cam-
paign contributions,216 mandates for access to private expressive prop-
erty,217 and allocations of mass media space and time.218  Those reforms 
indicate that ordinary political self-interest can correspond with egalitar-
ian aspirations toward broadened expressive access.  As to the abuse-of-
power concern, any suggestion that expressive distributions, including 
market distributions, could ever avoid government influence contradicts 
logic and history.219  Moreover, the Supreme Court has upheld reforms of 
all the types just noted, finding no dark pattern of censorship or manipu-
lation.  Tushnet, the regulatory reformer who focuses most intently on 
institutional considerations, suggests that this compatibility of ordinary 
politics with progressive constitutionalism provides a sufficient basis for 
preferring elected officials to judges as guardians of constitutional 
rights.220  The present political culture of the United States, however, 
presents greater obstacles to access reform than just those inherent to 
electoral politics.  Our present electoral system suffers from an amalgam 
of pathologies that dooms regulatory reformers’ vision of legislative and 
regulatory access reforms.   
 
b.  Pathologies of Unaccountability 
 
As discussed above, one benefit of a more egalitarian regime of 
media access accrues to the public generally.221  More egalitarian access 
to expressive opportunities means that the media offer the public a 
broader range of ideas, which should in turn improve the quality of public 
debate and the public’s level of confidence in the government decisions 
that public debate informs.  Enhancing public debate generally cuts 
against elected officials’ self-interest by encouraging challenges to the 
status quo.  Thus, for elected officials to fulfill the role regulatory re-
formers assign them, they must have good reason to believe that betray-
ing the public’s interest in enriching public debate will cost them more 
than forestalling reform to preserve the status quo will gain them.  They 
must, in other words, be accountable to the electorate.  Electoral account-
  
 216 See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (uphold-
ing state contribution limits). 
 217 See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (upholding 
property access requirement imposed by state consititution). 
 218 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (upholding must-carry 
rules for cable systems). 
 219 See SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note [x], at 36-37 (explaining inevitable influence 
of government regulatory structures on legal rights). 
 220 See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note [x], at 95-128 (positing that 
important constitutional values are “incentive-compatible”). 
 221 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
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ability requires a meaningfully competitive electoral process in which 
voters have realistic opportunities to unseat incumbent officials.  Unfor-
tunately, our electoral system in recent years has moved away from that 
competitive ideal.  Three especially pernicious and prominent failures of 
electoral accountability that discourage media access reforms are partisan 
gerrymandering of U.S. House districts, the calcification of the two-party 
duopoly, and the dominance of political money. 
In recent years, computer technology has transformed the power 
to draw electoral districts from a blunt instrument into a surgical scalpel.  
That transformation, in turn, has converted redistricting from a boost for 
challengers into a shield for incumbents.222  The district-drawing process 
has an especially significant effect on elections for the U.S. House of 
Representatives.223  Consultants adept in the process can manipulate the 
lines to exert decisive influence over apportionment of legislative power 
between the two major parties.224  At times and in states where some 
measure of partisan balance prevails, legislatures bargain over redistrict-
ing to build “safe” districts for incumbents of both parties.  Where one 
party dominates the state legislature, it often uses redistricting to disable 
the other party’s incumbents and/or to build “safe” districts for its own.  
Both of these “partisan gerrymandering” scenarios exploit the most pre-
dictable elements of the electorate to decrease the likelihood of electoral 
competition.225  The Supreme Court on three occasions has considered 
equal protection challenges to partisan gerrymandering, and three times it 
has declined to address the problem, in what stands as one of the least 
analytically satisfying lines of decisions in the Court’s recent history.226  
Partisan gerrymanders undermine the cause of media access reform on 
two levels.  First, diminished competition means that elected representa-
tives need not account to the electorate for their actions, because most 
elections are decided long before the voters have their say.  In the three 
national elections between 2000 and 2004, 87% of incumbent Senators 
and 97% of incumbent House members who sought reelection pre-
  
 222 See Sam Hirsch, The United States of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the 
Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L. J. 179, 182 (2003). 
 223 For a thorough and incisive account of the effect redistricting had on U.S. House 
races following the 2000 census, see id. 
 224 For a description of this process, see SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: 
THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION 17-27 (2006). 
 225 For a discussion of the threat that the systematic creation of safe electoral districts 
poses to the health of our democratic system, see Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and 
Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV. 253 (2006). 
 226 See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2607-12 
(2006) (plurality opinion) (finding no legally impermissible use of political classifications in 
off-year redistricting that increased Republican share of Texas’ 32-member House delega-
tion from 15 to 21 seats despite small decrease in Republican vote percentage); Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion) (finding no cause to grant relief for redis-
tricting designed to increase Republican share of Pennsylvania’s House delegation from ten 
of 21 seats to 13 of 19 seats); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality opinion) 
(failing to settle on standard of review for partisan gerrymandering claims). 
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vailed.227  In addition, partisan gerrymanders directly subvert public de-
bate by manipulating the process to decrease the likelihood that electoral 
debate can or will make a difference.228 
Recent years have also witnessed a growing divergence of popu-
lar and elite sentiment about the two-party duopoly that dominates our 
electoral politics.  Voters increasingly claim weak political party loyalties 
or identify as independent, rendering the parties more important as affin-
ity groups within government than as engines for mobilizing public de-
bate and participation in civic life.229  At the same time, the major parties 
have fought fiercely and successfully to preserve the mechanisms by 
which they control elections, resulting in an incongruous system in which 
two massive political organizations that command diminishing voter alle-
giance nonetheless hold governmental authority in a virtual hammer-
lock.230  The Supreme Court has allowed the two major parties to control 
primary elections as if they were private club meetings rather than forums 
for public debate and decision,231 and it has let parties treat certain ex-
penditures on behalf of their own nominees as “independent” under the 
campaign finance laws.232  At the same time, the Court has taken great 
pains to suppress the meek challenges our system permits to the two ma-
jor parties’ dominance.  The Justices have upheld state prohibitions on 
fusion candidacies, which allow minor parties to increase their profiles by 
co-nominating major-party candidates,233 and it has permitted televised 
debate sponsors to enforce standardless exclusions of minor-party candi-
  
 227 Center for Responsive Politics, Center for Responsive Politics Predicts ’06 Election 
Will Cost $2.6 Billion (Oct. 25, 2006), 
http://www.crp.org/pressreleases/2006/PreElection.10.25.asp (last visited Oct. 
26, 2006). 
 228 In a broader view, the issue of partisan gerrymanders implicates the question 
whether our longstanding system of single-member geographic districts filled by “winner 
take all” plurality voting makes for an effectively representative House of Representatives.  
See generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY (1994). 
 229 See generally Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court 
Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans From Political Com-
petition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 351-55. 
 230 For a discussion of the two-party duopoly and its theoretical underpinnings, see 
Magarian, Political Parties, supra note [x], at 1959-65. 
 231 See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) (rejecting First Amendment challenge 
to state’s semiclosed primary system, which barred registrants of one party from voting in 
another party’s primary); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (sus-
taining First Amendment challenge to state’s blanket primary system, which allowed pri-
mary voter to select a candidate on any party line for each office).  For further analysis of 
Jones, see Magarian, Political Parties, supra note [x], at 2011-23. 
 232 See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm’n v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) 
(striking down federal limits on expenditures parties make on behalf of candidates without 
direct coordination between party and candidate).  For further analysis, see Magarian, 
Political Parties, supra note [x], at 2023-31. 
 233 See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (rejecting First 
Amendment challenge to state ban on fusion candidacies).  For further analysis, see Ma-
garian, Political Parties, supra note [x], at 2031-37. 
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dates.234  Draconian ballot access laws in many jurisdictions continue to 
make minor party challenges all but impossible.235  The two-party du-
opoly’s continued structural dominance of our electoral system, like the 
manipulation of district lines, scuttles the hopes of regulatory reformers 
both by diminishing electoral competition, thereby decreasing elected 
officials’ accountability to voters, and by directly suppressing the multi-
faceted debate that an electoral system more open to dynamic competition 
would foster. 
Our present electoral system further erodes political accountabil-
ity through the ever-increasing dominance of political money.236  No one 
can mount a credible campaign for Congress without raising, or already 
possessing, enormous funds.  On the eve of the 2006 midterm elections, 
the average House candidate had raised over three quarters of a million 
dollars, while the average Senate candidate had raised almost $6 mil-
lion.237  Incumbents could boast a nearly four-to-one fundraising advan-
tage over challengers.238  Total expenditures for the midterms were on 
pace to shatter the record-breaking midterm expenditures of 2002 by 
eighteen percent.239  The Supreme Court has facilitated this state of af-
fairs by holding campaign expenditure regulations categorically unconsti-
tutional.240  My point here is not to revisit the question of campaign fi-
nance regulations’ constitutionality, although the First Amendment theory 
that animates the case for access rights would permit significant limits.241  
Whether or not unfettered campaign spending deserves constitutional 
protection, it corrodes electoral accountability.  Like district manipulation 
and the two-party duopoly, political money does not serve but rather sup-
plants electoral competition and public debate.  The allegiance elected 
  
 234 See Arkasas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (rejecting First 
Amendment challenge to public broadcaster’s standardless restriction of televised candidate 
debates to major parties’ candidates).  For further analysis, see Magarian, Political Parties, 
supra note [x], at 2038-42. 
 235 See generally Richard Winger, More Choice Please! Why U.S. Ballot Access Laws Are 
Discriminatory and How Independent Parties and Candidates Challenge Them., in RONALD 
HAYDUK & KEVIN MATTSON EDS., DEMOCRACY’S MOMENT: REFORMING THE AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 31 (2002). 
 236 This article cannot undertake a thorough examination of campaign finance as an 
object of political and legal controversy.  For an excellent introduction to the major issues, 
see Burt Neuborne, One Dollar – One Vote: A Preface to Debating Campaign Finance Re-
form, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1997).  My position necessarily reflects normative and empirical 
premises about the role of money in the political process.  For a concise and lucid account of 
a position based on very different premises, see Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and 
Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996). 
 237 Center for Responsive Politics, supra note [x]. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. 
 240 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-59 (1976) (per curiam).  The Court recently 
reaffirmed its prohibition on expenditure regulations in Randall v. Sorrell, ___ U.S. ___, 126 
S. Ct. 2479 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
 241 See Magarian, Political Parties, supra note [x], at 2028-30 (discussing consequences 
of a public rights First Amendment analysis for Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign 
Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996)). 
 10/31/2006 7:45:25 AM 
  41 
officials and political parties owe to the moneyed interests that finance 
their victories crowds out their concern for ordinary voters and gives 
them a huge incentive to protect the economic as well as political status 
quo.242  Political money further decreases accountability by creating a 
climate of alienation among people of modest means, discouraging them 
from participating in the electoral process and thus from staking any 
claim to their representatives’ attention.243  As for political discourse, our 
system of minimal constraints on turning money into electoral speech acts 
effectively as a debate tax, ensuring a high correlation between economic 
power and expressive volume and thus drowning out less lavishly fi-
nanced ideas.244  Advocates of unrestricted political money intone the 
mantra that more money means more speech, conveniently ignoring the 
corollary that greater expense means numbing repetition of the same nar-
row range of ideas. 
 
c.  Pathologies of Exclusion  
 
The other primary benefit of a more egalitarian regime of media 
access accrues to the particular people whose expressive opportunities 
such a regime enhances.  Those beneficiaries, through meaningful par-
ticipation in public decisionmaking, can fulfill their rights of equal citi-
zenship and claim a greater stake in public decisions.245  In order for 
elected officials to care about that targeted benefit, however, they must 
represent the members of those socially marginal groups.  The failures of 
general political accountability discussed above disproportionately affect 
members of socially marginal groups: drawing of electoral districts con-
tinues to undermine the democratic aspirations of people of color;246 the 
two “big tent” parties marginalize social and ideological outliers;247 and 
political money necessarily diminishes poor people’s influence over elec-
tions.  Even beyond those disproportionate failures of accountability, our 
electoral system has found distinctive ways to diminish the ability of poor 
and socially marginalized members of the political community to pursue 
  
 242 See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil 
Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301 (1989) (examining influence of political money on 
actions of elected officials). 
 243 See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amend-
ment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 638 (1982) (justifying cam-
paign finance regulation as a means to ameliorate voter apathy that corrodes democracy). 
 244 See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcast-
ing, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 105, 111-16 (discussing “drowning out” effect of unregulated politi-
cal money). 
 245 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
 246 See generally GUINIER, supra note [x]. Once again, the Supreme Court in recent 
years has exacerbated this problem by weakening the legal basis for racially remedial redis-
tricting.  See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (striking down redistricting plan 
designed to remedy underrepresentation of black voters on ground that “bizarre” character 
of districts under plan indicated racial motivation behind its design). 
 247 See generally Terry Smith, A Black Party? Timmons, Black Backlash and the En-
dangered Two-Party Paradigm, 48 DUKE L.J. 1 (1998).  
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greater political empowerment through media access reforms.  Perhaps 
our electoral system’s most appalling methods of discouraging elected 
officials from enhancing poor and marginalized speakers’ expressive op-
portunities are outright intimidation and suppression of voters of color, 
burdensome electoral procedures and “antifraud” initiatives designed to 
disqualify poor and socially marginalized voters, and draconian felon 
disenfranchisement laws that disproportionately impact the poor and vot-
ers of color. 
Our electoral system continues to tolerate a shocking degree of 
outright racial and ethnic discrimination. Voters of color frequently re-
ceive misinformation about times and requirements for voting.248   Mass 
mailings or telephone calls on numerous occasions have either given false 
advice or set voters up for special challenges and scrutiny at the polls.249  
Some mailings have warned that undercover FBI agents or immigration 
officials intended to patrol polling places to enforce criminal penalties for 
voter fraud.250  At polling places, poll watchers have targeted African-
American and Latino voters, taking their photographs and asking for 
identification, denying them assistance, and sometimes even openly in-
timidating them.251  Such tactics take root more easily because few people 
of color work at polling places,252 and poll workers receive inadequate 
training to assist non-English speaking voters.253  Laws in most states 
prohibit voter interference and intimidation, but few provide specific 
means of deterring or curbing these practices.254  Intimidation and thwart-
ing of voters of color occurs even absent racist animus, because continued 
racial polarization in voting often makes racial targeting strategically use-
ful.255  Gulfs in wealth, education, and English proficiency between white 
and nonwhite voters exacerbate the electoral system’s capacity to exclude 
  
 248 See People for the American Way Foundation and NAACP, The Long Shadow of Jim 
Crow:  Voter Intimidation and Suppression in America Today 7 (2004) (hereinafter Long 
Shadow) (describing leaflet distributed in African-American communities in Louisiana in 
2002 that encouraged voters to wait to vote until three days after election day); id. (describ-
ing notices posted in African-American precincts in Baltimore that listed the incorrect date 
for election day and warned that any parking tickets or overdue rent must be paid prior to 
voting) 
 249 See Sherry A. Swirsky, Minority Voter Intimidation:  The Problem That Won’t Go 
Away, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 359, 361-62 (2002) (describing 1986 Louisiana 
mailing designed to challenge residency of African-American voters); id. at 362-63 (describ-
ing similar incident in North Carolina in 1990); id. at 365 (describing 1990 Texas mailing 
that told voters of color to destroy absentee ballots they had requested, which would bar 
them from voting under state law); id. at 365 (describing calls falsely attributed to NAACP 
on eve of 2000 election that urged African Americans to vote for George W. Bush). 
 250 See Long Shadow, supra note [x], at 9-11; Swirsky, supra note [x], at 359. 
 251 See Laughlin McDonald, The New Poll Tax, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Dec. 30, 2002) at 
___; see also Swirsky, supra note [x], at 363 (describing Republican “ballot security” pro-
gram in California that hired uniformed security guards to patrol heavily Latino precincts). 
 252 See Barry H. Weinberg and Lyn Utrecht, Problems in America’s Polling Places:  
How They Can Be Stopped, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 401, 420 (2002). 
 253 See id at 422. 
 254 See id. at 426. 
 255 For illustrations of this phenomenon, see OVERTON, supra note [x], at 72-79. 
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voters of color.256  In addition, increasing attacks on provisions for bilin-
gual ballots threaten further diminution of Latino and Asian-American 
voters’ already low rates of electoral participation.257  All of these gam-
bits make a mockery of any hope that elected officials will enact access 
reforms to increase the ability of voters of color to influence public de-
bate.  Barring or discouraging people from voting also alienates them 
from electoral and political debate, disproportionately skewing public 
discourse away from their perspectives and concerns and thus exacerbat-
ing the conditions that make access rights imperative. 
Beyond outright intimidation and interference, local control over 
voting procedures creates endless opportunities for entrenched state and 
local authorities to throw hurdles in the way of voters who might oppose 
the status quo.258  The present trend toward more restrictive voting re-
quirements represents a retrenchment after a period of greater inclusive-
ness beginning in the 1960s.259  An especially ominous addition to the 
procedural gauntlet is the present campaign, engineered by conservative 
groups, to impose state and local laws to require photo or other identifica-
tion for voting.  At least five states have added voter identification re-
quirements since 2000, while political or judicial battles over identifica-
tion laws continue in several others.260  Although advocates of identifica-
tion requirements assert an intention to curb massive voting fraud, no 
evidence points to any serious problem.261  Given U.S. citizens’ low rate 
of voter participation, relative to earlier periods in our own history and to 
voting rates in other advanced democracies, imposing burdensome and 
unhelpful procedural constraints on voters seems perverse.  The purpose 
and effect of identification laws, however, is to discourage and inhibit 
voters of color and the poor.262  The fact that some laws provide more 
lenient standards for absentee votes, which carry stronger risks of fraud 
but find disproportionate use among white voters, underscores the racial 
strategy behind the antifraud smokescreen.263  The addition of identifica-
tion requirements to our electoral system’s already formidable gauntlet of 
voting requirements further frays the connection between elected officials 
  
 256 See id. at 82. 
 257 See id. at 131-47. 
 258 See id. at 45; Ronald Hayduk, The Weight of History: Election Reform During the 
Progressive Era and Today, in HAYDUK & MATTSON, supra note [x], at 29, 40-42.  Even a 
seemingly basic component of our electoral process such as mandatory preregistration for 
voting disproportionately deters the poor and people of color from the polls.  See id. at 31 
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 262 See id. at 153; Swirsky, supra note [x], at367-68. 
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and the speakers whose contributions to democratic discourse access re-
forms would enhance. 
An additional strategy for purging the rolls of poor and minority 
voters is legal disenfranchisement of convicted felons.  Almost every 
state denies the vote to people presently incarcerated on felony convic-
tions.264  More controversially, three states permanently disenfranchise 
ex-offenders,265 and nine others permanently disenfranchise certain cate-
gories of ex-offenders or impose waiting periods following the comple-
tion of an offender’s sentence before allowing application for restoration 
of voting rights.266  Recent years have seen a modest trend toward loosen-
ing restrictions on felon voting,267 but several states have increased their 
restrictions.268  An estimated 5.3 million Americans may not vote as a 
result of felony convictions.269  More than two million of those ineligible 
voters have completed their sentences.270  The racial impact of felon dis-
enfranchisement laws is particularly egregious, with black men disenfran-
chised at a rate seven times the national average.271   Felon disenfran-
chisement laws deny the vote to thirteen percent of all black men – 1.4 
million men who would otherwise be eligible to vote.272  Convicted fel-
ons, widely despised and shunned for reasons that give them important 
and underpublicized perspectives on important public issues, epitomize 
the potential benefits of access reforms.  Felon disenfranchisement laws, 
however, ensure that this is the last group of citizens to whom elected 
officials will ever feel responsible and from whom the rest of us will ever 
hear. 
  
 264 Laws in 48 states and the District of Columbia disenfranchise inmates incarcerated 
for felonies.  The Sentencing Project, Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2006) (here-
inafter Sentencing Project, Laws).  Thirty-six states disenfranchise felons on parole, and 31 
of those states also disenfranchise felons on probation.  Id.  Maine and Vermont extend 
voting rights to incarcerated felons.  Id. 
 265 Id.  Florida, Kentucky, and Virginia permanently disenfranchise any person with a 
felony conviction.  Id.  Restoration of voting rights in Florida and Kentucky must be ap-
proved by the governor.  Marc Mauer and Tushar Kansal, The Sentencing Project, Barred 
for Life: Voting Rights Restoration in Permanent Disenfranchisement States (2005), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/barredforlife.pdf (last visited July 29, 
2006).  Ex-offenders in Virginia may petition courts to regain the right to vote, but persons 
convicted of violent offenses or of manufacturing or distributing drugs may not petition.  Id.      
 266 Sentencing Project, Laws, supra note [x] 
 267 Of 13 states that have adopted changes to their felon disenfranchisement laws 
within the past ten years, eight reduced restrictions.   Sentencing Project, Laws, supra note 
[x]. 
 268 Massachusetts and Utah have recently disenfranchised incarcerated felons, and 
Kansas expanded disenfranchisement laws to felons on probation.  Steven Kalogeras, The 
Sentencing Project, Legislative Changes on Felony Disenfranchisement 1996-2003 1 (2003), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/legchanges-report.pdf (last visited Oct. 
26, 2006). 
 269 Sentencing Project, Laws, supra note [x].   
 270 Id. 
 271 Id.  
 272 Id.  
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Our electoral system’s pathologies of unaccountability and exclu-
sion make trusting elected officials to implement expressive access re-
forms an indefensible gamble.  Accordingly, we should not be surprised 
that federal media regulations in recent years have dramatically dimin-
ished competition and diversity while further consolidating the domi-
nance of the largest media corporations.273  An unfortunate irony of the 
regulatory reform critique is that our electoral system’s failure to engage 
and represent the people, which regulatory reformers fail to address, ulti-
mately reflects the same hegemony of economic power they attack so 
eloquently.  Regulatory reformers’ faith in the elected branches, like lib-
ertarians’ faith in the economic market, leads to a dead end in the quest 
for more informative and participatory democratic debate.  The two cri-
tiques’ failures point that quest back toward the First Amendment.  Even 
though the Supreme Court has exacerbated the electoral pathologies dis-
cussed in this section and built a discouraging record on media access 
issues,274 constitutional law and judicial review continue to hold great 
promise as engines of access reform.  
 
2.  Putting the “Rights” Back in Access Rights 
 
The regulatory reform critique objects to judicially enforced First 
Amendment access rights on two distinct grounds: theoretical and institu-
tional.  On a theoretical level, regulatory reform critics reject the First 
Amendment as a legal basis for expanding access to the means of expres-
sion.275  On an institutional level, they question judges’ capacity to de-
velop doctrines of expanded access.276  Both of these objections rest on 
legitimate and substantial concerns.  Regulatory reformers’ discomfort 
with constitutional rights as vessels for social change responds to pro-
gressives’ sometimes excessive reliance on litigation to implement policy 
agendas in the wake of the Warren Court’s rights revolution and the sub-
sequent conservative tilt in the country’s political mood.277  Their institu-
tional doubt about courts’ capacity to effectuate social change responds to 
courts’ failures to follow through on initially promising initiatives, such 
as integration of public schools, and reflect the rhetorical difficulty of 
defending judicially managed social reform.278  The regulatory reform 
critique, however, substantially overstates both the theoretical disadvan-
  
 273 See Goodman, supra note [x], at 1446-48 (identifying recent regulations’ contribu-
tions to increased media concentration); Moglen, supra note [x] (condemning corporatist 
character of 1996 Telecommunications Act). 
 274 See Magarian, Colliding Interests, supra note [x], at ___ (discussing Court’s recent 
failures to implement or approve many access reforms). 
 275 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
 276 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
 277 See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note [x], at 141-43 (criticizing liber-
als’ excessive resort to language of rights). 
 278 See id. at 177 (criticizing liberals’ fear of voting and overreliance on judicial review 
to achieve social change). 
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tages of constitutional rights and the institutional disadvantages of courts. 
The regulatory reform critics oppose framing media access in 
terms of constitutional rights because they mistrust both the general 
rhetoric of rights and the particular conception of the First Amendment 
that supports access rights.  Both concerns implicate important normative 
controversies that I have addressed elsewhere, and I reprise my views 
only in summary fashion here.  The regulatory reformers’ general concern 
reflects a valuable insight that conceptions of “rights” necessarily depend 
on normative priorities in designing legal structures.279  The language of 
rights, however, remains crucial for arguments about expressive access as 
long as we acknowledge the underlying conflicts of interests and values 
those arguments necessarily embody.  The First Amendment provides an 
analytic channel for courts’ understandings of democratic values and the 
people’s substantive ideals as well as a textual basis for judicial review 
that the people and our elected representatives consider legitimate.280  It 
also offers a unique source of rhetorical power for any argument about 
how speech should function in society, including arguments for access 
reforms.281  Regulatory reformers’ specific concern about the constitu-
tional basis for access rights arises from the gulf between the autonomy-
based theory of the First Amendment they largely accept and the egalitar-
ian, democracy-focused First Amendment theory Barron and other propo-
nents of access rights advance.  Barron’s sort of theory has the strong 
normative advantages of deepening constitutional protection for espe-
cially valuable and vulnerable expression282 and providing a concrete, 
functional rationale for protecting speech that resonates with both our 
society’s deep commitment to participatory democracy and the central 
purpose of the Constitution.283  
Beyond their substantive concerns about the First Amendment as 
a basis for equalizing expressive access, the regulatory reform critics dis-
pute courts’ capacity to direct a regime of enhanced media access rights.  
This institutional competence argument has undeniable force; no system 
of constitutional adjudication could, or should, micromanage complex 
  
 279 See BAKER, supra note [x], at 193 (explaining that conceptions of rights vary with 
underlying normative theories of democracy); TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra 
note [x], at 13 (describing role of normative differences in opposing interpretations of consti-
tutional rights); Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note [x], at 25-28 (describing effect over time 
of changes in prevailing normative values on changes in prevailing conceptions of constitu-
tional rights). 
 280 See Magarian, Political Parties, supra note [x], at 1990 (contending that language of 
rights plays proper and useful role in disputes about political structures). 
 281 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1789-90 (2004) (discussing 
the “magnetism” of the First Amendment). 
 282 See Magarian, Public-Private Distinction, supra note [x], at 105-14 (describing util-
ity of public rights theory of expressive freedom for effectively protecting wartime political 
debate). 
 283 See Magarian, Political Parties, supra note [x], at 1980-88 (describing key character-
istics of public rights theory of expressive freedom). 
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social controversies.  But no access rights advocate has ever pretended 
such micromanagement was necessary, let alone proper.  Some access 
controversies – for example, whether a media corporation may refuse to 
sell advertising space to a political activist – lie fully within courts’ insti-
tutional capacities.  In more complicated contexts, such as disputes about 
concentration of media ownership, a court could articulate a general First 
Amendment mandate aimed at enriching and diversifying debate, resolve 
the immediate dispute pursuant to that mandate, and leave the elected 
branches to enact and enforce regulatory structures that satisfy it. To the 
extent the elected branches did succeed in implementing access reforms, 
courts would play an essential role in articulating the First Amendment 
values behind the reforms and ensuring that regulatory enforcement ad-
vanced those values.284  Elsewhere I have contended that courts can and 
should apply to expressive access controversies a principle of “participa-
tion reinforcing review.”285  That extrapolation from the familiar idea of 
representation reinforcement would lead courts, in First Amendment dis-
putes that set access interests against autonomy interests, to make rulings 
and develop legal standards that maximized opportunities for participa-
tion in public debate. 
Even if we establish that courts can implement access reform un-
der the First Amendment, the regulatory reform critique raises doubts 
about whether courts will do so.  The Supreme Court’s record on access 
issues in both the electoral and media contexts appears to paint a gloomy 
picture.  Paradoxically, however, the Court’s recent conservative activism 
illustrates the powerful effects that changes in prevailing legal theories 
can have on the distribution of expressive opportunities.  Hope for chang-
ing courts’ theoretical orientation, now or at any time, rests on the insight 
that judges are less institutionally beholden than elected officials to en-
trenched interests.  Perhaps, as regulatory reformers have argued, our 
era’s judicial conservatism actually reflects a historical norm against pro-
gressive change, interrupted only briefly by the Warren Court, that no 
appeal to reason can hope to dislodge.286  In my view, however, judicial 
attitudes are too mutable, and the stakes of the access rights issue to high, 
to give up the effort.  I am not advancing the argument that “we have the 
wrong judges,” whose futility Tushnet rightly derides.287  I simply note 
that judges’ orientations do change, and have changed, through appeals 
and processes that circumvent the formidable pathologies of our electoral 
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system.  For now, at least, theoretical arguments about the constitutional 
wisdom of access rights may well face less resistance in the judicial 
sphere than political activism for access reform faces in the legislative 
and regulatory spheres.   
Adroitly linking the conceptual limits of rights and the institu-
tional limits of courts, Baker objects to access rights on the ground that 
the theoretical underpinnings of democracy, and thus the optimal distribu-
tion of media access for facilitating democracy, are highly contestable.288  
He supports his premise with an account of the differences among interest 
group pluralism, civic republicanism, and a “best of both worlds” position 
he labels “complex democracy.”289  Baker’s argument transcends the par-
tisanship of libertarian objections to the republican underpinnings of ac-
cess rights290 by maintaining that no theoretical perspective should 
achieve hegemony through the force of constitutional law.  No one could 
dispute Baker’s premise that democratic theory is endlessly contestable, 
but he fails to establish why courts cannot or should not join the contest.  
One relatively narrow problem with Baker’s argument is that his rigid 
distinction among democratic theories creates a distorted picture in which 
hidebound commitments to utterly antithetical views of democracy drive 
public debate – in which republicans, for example, care nothing for the 
presence in public discourse of clashing points of view.291  Barron, in 
contrast, conceived the constitutional dimension of access rights as serv-
ing both the participatory values Baker associates with pluralist democ-
racy and the informational values he associates with republican democ-
racy.292 
A deeper problem with Baker’s analysis is that courts neither can 
nor should resolve constitutional disputes without regard to democratic 
theory.  Baker attempts to constrain judicial review in First Amendment 
cases by distinguishing “traditional censorship,” a matter about which he 
claims all salient democratic theories agree, from the structural architec-
ture of media, a matter he calls too contestable and contingent for consti-
tutional adjudication.293  Baker’s categories, however, are themselves far 
more contestable and contingent than he suggests.  Is a purportedly neu-
tral tax that disproportionately burdens particular publications censorious 
or architectural?294  What about a requirement that broadcasters must sell 
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advertising space at market rates to political candidates,295 or that cable 
systems must devote part of their channel array to stations of the govern-
ment’s choosing?296  The media challengers to all of those regulations 
would (and did) complain of censorship, while the government would 
(and did) characterize its intervention as architectural.  Both characteriza-
tions have force, and neither can save a court seriously committed to en-
forcing the First Amendment from having to consider how our democratic 
commitments require expressive freedom to work.  In a broader sense, 
our constitutional jurisprudence simply has never treated the theoretical 
indeterminacy of a case as a basis for judicial abstention.297  If courts 
could not decide cases with contestable theoretical underpinnings, then 
they could not enforce constitutional rights at all. 
Legal realism long ago established that courts operate within, not 
apart from, democratic politics.  The regulatory reformers follow the line 
of judicial skeptics who consider courts’ inevitably political nature a rea-
son to constrain their use of constitutional mandates.  If courts openly 
declared abstract democratic principles, and then forcefully invoked those 
principles to strike down a wide range of government actions, the skep-
tics’ concern would carry great weight.  Courts, however, do not operate 
that way.  Instead, they sublimate the abstract theoretical grounds for 
their constitutional decisions, both because Article III limits their deci-
sional ambit298 and because not even our system of strong judicial review 
confers the institutional fortitude courts would need to make such sweep-
ing pronouncements.  Courts can, and must, base their constitutional de-
cisions on underlying democratic precepts that the people will accept – 
among which, I believe, is the principle that effective democracy requires 
a broad distribution of opportunities to participate in public debate.  Be-
cause background precepts are not holdings, courts can test and alter the 
democratic underpinnings of their decisions through the dialogue in 
which they necessarily engage with other political actors and the peo-
ple.299  The judicial branch, in its own way, is as much a creature of our 
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democratic system as Congress, and the judiciary’s peculiar set of democ-
ratic constraints protects it, and us, from unduly hidebound constitutional 
decisions. 
    
CONCLUSION 
 
For at least fifteen years, judicial and scholarly attention to the 
idea of First Amendment access rights has ranged from dismissive to hos-
tile.  Far too often the critics have gotten a free pass.  Libertarians deride 
access rights as an authoritarian plot against economic distributions of 
expressive opportunities.  Their market triumphalism, however, papers 
over the severe doctrinal, theoretical, and above all normative failings of 
a constitutional vision that substitutes economic power for robust public 
debate.  Regulatory reformers extol the possibilities of legislative and 
regulatory access reform while dismissing the prospects of judicially en-
forced access rights.  Their inattention to our electoral system’s patholo-
gies of unaccountability and exclusion, however, fatally skews their insti-
tutional prescription.  The time has come to reclaim and extend the trail 
Jerome Barron blazed forty years ago.  Deploying an egalitarian First 
Amendment theory in pursuit of a democratic discourse that would better 
inform the political community while giving greater voice to that com-
munity’s poor and marginalized members, Barron’s case for access rights 
still offers a bold, optimistic blueprint for the expressive freedom a self-
governing people needs and deserves. 
Recent fashion’s regrettable disdain for access rights has diverted 
attention from the pivotal questions of what forms access rights should 
take and which institution(s) should determine those forms.  Although 
this article takes sharp issue with the regulatory reform critique of access 
rights, the regulatory reformers deserve credit for asking important ques-
tions.  As Barron’s own writings acknowledge, we cannot expect consti-
tutional courts alone to transform the expressive landscape.  Any effec-
tive broadening of expressive access will require the elected branches’ 
political authority and policymaking expertise.  Accordingly, access 
rights advocates might benefit in the near term from turning intellectual 
energy toward securing judicial scrutiny of the electoral pathologies that 
presently undermine aspirations toward legislative and regulatory access 
reforms.  Legal theorists usually address what I have called the electoral 
pathologies of unaccountability and exclusion under equal protection 
principles.  Because those pathologies directly impede informative and 
inclusive political debate, however, they also offend the same First 
Amendment values at stake in media access controversies.  Pursuing judi-
cial scrutiny of electoral structures in order to enable access reforms 
would acknowledge the elected branches’ essential role in expanding me-
dia access while reaffirming Barron’s wisdom in articulating a First 
Amendment foundation for that expansion – a foundation of access rights. 
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